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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I will explore the impact of three bailout programs offered by the 
International Monetary Fund during the Asian Financial Crisis. I evaluate the capabilities 
of these programs to stabilize the markets in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea by 
critically examining the Asia economic background, the International Monetary Fund, 
and the events of Asian Financial Crisis. I conclude that these programs did not have 
large impact on the volatility in these three countries. In addition, these programs are 
insignificant to the abnormal return of markets in these countries. Therefore, these 
programs associated with high cost cannot stabilize these countries' economy during the 
Asian Financial Crisis. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
On July 2, 1997, the Thailand government announced a change from a fixed 
exchange rate policy into floating exchange rate policy after heavily defending against 
speculators attack in the previous several months. This date marked the beginning of the 
Asian Financial Crisis. The Crisis lasted over ten months. Five Asian countries, included 
Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines were directly affected, 
and most of the Asian countries were influenced to a different degree. In the aftermath of 
the Crisis, there have been many research papers related to this topic conducted by 
different economists and financial analysts. In Radelet and Sachs (1998), it stated that 
the International Monetary Fund's bailout programs, associated with faulty policies, 
created panic for the three Asian countries. This argument was one of the main 
hypotheses and interpretations of the Crisis from the current existing papers. On the 
other side, the International Monetary Fund proposed these programs in order to stabilize 
the severe economic situations in different Asian countries. The main purposes of the 
programs were trying to restructure the confidence of the countries' economies, and 
rebuild the inappropriate monetary and fiscal policies. 
There is a major conflict between the non-IMF economists and the International 
Monetary Fund point of view on the issue of the bailout programs provided for these 
three Asian countries. This leads to my question: "Did the llVIF Bailout Programs 
Stabilize the Markets of Southeast Asia during the Asian Financial Crisis?" To obtain an 
answer to this question, I will conduct my research in the following manner. 
This consists of two .;)v\. •• IV'U.;). first section will cover the background 
and functions 
economIC 
before the 
the International 
of Asian region 
uu,"""'.,""'" Crisis. 
Fund. The second 
1987 96, ten years 
studies the 
conditions 
.;)v\. ... vu will describe the the first 
International Monetary Fund during 
events to the 
to 1998. The second "',","'U'I,)'U will focus on the 
causes of Financial Crisis. first half of Chapter 3 will concentrate on the 
details of bailouts provided by the Monetary Fund. 
second a critical initial version programs. Chapter 4 
will an empirical analysis. It use an event-study ... vuv. to assess the impact 
of the bailout programs announced by 
test for abnormal return on the 
around announcements. 
same variables 
will conclude the study. 
International Monetary Fund. The model will 
market, foreign V/l.''''H<'U~;V 
I will test for 
and interest rate 
III financial HU-U"-''-'' 
the impact of the bailout programs. Chapter 5 
2 
Section 
The International Monetary Fund 
1990s, the International Monetary (IMF) increased its publicity and 
visibility to the public through the Mexico and Financial Crisis. 
crises, the International Monetary Fund as a mysterious organization In the 
U"".LV""'" scenes. Most people think that the World controls Internati onal 
Monetary and it subsidizes economic development of ... n.{\,..~>,.. countries. People are 
also confused that International Monetary Fund controls the money creation of world 
scale. this section, I will describe International Monetary Fund precisely its 
different areas, such as (1) history; (2) statutory purposes; (3) membership, 
and voting; (4) organization and operations; and (5) and functions. these 
International ~i-P"Pt'\t areas, the discussion helps to clarify misconceptions of 
Monetary 
(1) History 
During Great epresslon in the 1 all of economic life the world 
were in diminishing. failed, interest rates inflation rates rose sharply, 
extremely 
production, and land 
rate arose, agricultural fell below the cost of 
plummeted. lack of confidence in paper money led to an 
Increase demand for precious such as gold and so that treasuries could 
not have enough reserve to supply. forced several countries, by the United 
Kingdom, to abandon the standard as indicator for the known and stable value of 
its currency when comparing with the value of currency became 
3 
uncertain. When doing foreign currency exchange between countries with the gold 
standard and countries abandoned the gold standard, this caused inconvenience III 
exchanging process and difficult to value between different currenCIes. During that 
period, the average worldwide prices of goods fell by 48 percent worldwide and the value 
of international trade fell by 63 percent between 1929 and 1932 1• 
In the early 1940s, Harry Dexter White in the United States and John Maynard 
Keynes in the United Kingdom proposed a system to be supervised permanent by a 
cooperative organization worldwide. The system should react to the needs of the time, 
encourage the unrestricted conversion of one currency into another, establish a clear and 
unambiguous value of each currency, and eliminate restrictions and practices that had 
brought the same situation in 1930s. After four years of discussions, constructions, and 
negotiations between each nation, the International Monetary Fund was finally 
established when 29 countries signed its "Articles of Agreement" or its charter at the 
conference held in Bretton Wood, New Hampshire, United States, from July 1 - 22, 1944, 
which 44 countries attended. The formation of International Monetary Fund constituted 
the core of the Bretton Woods System. The International Monetary Fund became official 
existence on December 27, 1945. It began operations in Washington D.C., United States 
in May 1946 and had financial operations on March 1, 1947. 
I Driscoll (1998) 
4 
(2) Statutory Purposes 
According to the "Articles of Agreement", the International Monetary Fund has 
six major statutory purposes that it needs to carry out through all of its functions and 
programs. The six statutory purposes summarized as follow: 
1. To encourage international monetary cooperation through a pennanent institution, 
which provides the basic guidance for consultation and collaboration on international 
monetary problems; 
2. To enhance the expansion and balanced growth of international trade. In addition, the 
primary objective in economic policy for all of its members to follow will be in 
promoting and maintaining of high levels of employment and real income and to the 
development of the productive resources; 
3. To promote currency exchange rate stability through maintaining orderly exchange 
arrangements among members, and avoiding competitive exchange rate depreciation; 
4. To help in establishing of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current 
transactions between members and eliminate of foreign exchange restrictions which 
hamper the growth of world trade; 
5. To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund 
temporarily available to them in providing them with opportunity to correct short-
tenn unbalance in their balance of payments without affecting the national or 
international economic situations; 
6. In accordance with the above, the International Monetary Fund helps its members to 
shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international 
balances of payments. 
5 
(3) Membership, Quotas, Voting 
According to their countries' eCOinolm policies, all countries are to join or 
quit their membership of the International Monetary Fund. When a country is willing to 
join, it to International Monetary Fund's charter of obligations. 
Recently, all major are the International Monetary Fund members. The growth 
of membership is from 29 member countries in 1 to 1 member countries 2000. 
sum of money, called "quota 
the International Monetary Fund. 
Each country a 
subscription", as a umon when they 
first purpose of the quota system is having a pool of money that the International 
Monetary can draw to its short-term 
second purpose is having the standard in """'c"" .... '" on how much its 
member countries can borrow when they need to balance their foreign payments. 
third is to allocate In Rights (SDR), which 
is a basket currency comprising major individual currency and will have more detail on 
11, in proportion corresponding to their quotas. The fourth purpose of quota is 
acting as a tool to allocate voting on the daily to how much 
country contributes to International Monetary Fund. 
The quota will review every five years acc:onjIn to the eccmomv situations of its 
member countries. country can Increase its voting power In 
International Monetary Fund when doing the quota process. Recently, five 
members with __ "' ___ proportion of quotas are the United States, 
and United Kingdom, which has the 18.25 percent, 5.67 percent, 5.67 percent, 
5.10 percent, and 5.10 percent respectively. 
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(4) Organization and 
The fundamental operations International Monetary Fund depend on 
decision of its members. 
commands clearly run from 
vice versa. Therefore, the 
the will of majority 
International Monetary 
been voted. However, 
encourage them to conform to 
The organization of the 
the Board of Governors at 
Executive Board, which 
and Deputy Managing 
Managing 
Office-Staff Retirement 
and Inspection. addition, 
UVl'''''''':> of the organization to follow. The 
to the International Monetary Fund and not 
Fund acts as an intermediary hpT"lJPf'T'I 
of minority countries. 
members to follow the 
''''LtVU'''' Monetary Fund can exert 
and regulations that they pledged to "'U'Prt,rp 
Monetary Fund is highly systematic. It 
the organization. The following one IS 
24 executive members. Then, the Managing 
the supervision of Managing 
finance-related departments included 
to 
& Planning, and Audit 
J.u".Uuo''''o Director and Deputy 
oversee different areas including Area Departments, Functional 
Services Departments, llIlornlatllon and Liaison, and Support Services. Each ",U\-.vHl'" area 
has different institutions to accomplish different 1.1 
showed the International ..... ,Ju .... "" Fund Organization Chart. Exhibit 1.2 had 
description of each its the International Monetary Fund. 
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Exhibit 1.1 
In te rna tional 
Area 
African 
Department 
II 
Dept 
Middle 
Eastern 
Western 
Dept 
Fund Organization Chart 
Fiscal 
Affairs 
Dept 
Vienna 
Institute 
Singapore 
Training 
Institute 
Dept 
Exchange 
Affairs 
Dept 
Director 
Directors 
Function & Special 
Services 
Treasurer's 
Dept 
8 
Office of Office-Staff Office of 
Budget & Retirement Internal Audit 
Planning Plan & Inspection 
Information Support 
& Liaison Services 
External Human 
Relations Resources 
Dept Dept 
Office in 
Geneva Services 
Office in 
Asia & 
Pacific 
Nations 
Exhibit 1.2 
Brief 1'I",~u'I"'intjinn 
Entity 
Board of Governors 
Executive Board 
Director 
Investment Office-
Staff Retirement 
Plan 
Office of Budget & 
Planning 
nn'~itilnn in the International Monetary Fund 
Description 
One from each of its members, which are ministers of finance or heads of central 
banks and they for their own government. The Interim Committee and IMFI 
World Bank Development Committee provide advices on the needs of poorer 
countries. They gather occasion of annual meetings to deal with IMF matters 
24 executive directors meeting at least 3 times per week to the 
implementation of policies approved from the Board of Governors. Recently, 8 
executives each country, which are China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia. Saudi 
Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The other 16 executives each 
represent different group of countries 
Appointed by chairman of Executive Board. The Managing Director who is an 
European or at least a non-American the 2,600 staff of IMF from 122 
countries and are international civil servants for world interests 
Attached to the Office of Managing Director. It deals with the issues on investment 
of the Fund and the retirement plan for the staff in organization 
Attached to the Office of Managing Director. It deals with the issues on budget 
planning for different departments and the whole organization for each fiscal year 
Office of Internal naging Director. It acts as an third person to oversee of 
Audit and Inspection the whole organization. The includes internal audit and inspection of 
Area 
Functional and 
Special Services 
Departments 
Information & 
Liaison 
Services 
different and 
6 area cover geographical, include African, Asia and Pacific, European 
I and II, Middle Eastern, and Western Departments, are with at least 
one desk economist is assigned to each country. Responsibility of each economists 
are maintaining the Fund's relations with its members; develop and maintain 
M~lt:::.~,:::.",<>· keep track the economic development; and assist in preparing report 
for IMF's Executive Board. 
The economic that cover a economic function instead of 
geographical area. include Fiscal IMF Institute, & Exchange 
Affairs, Legal, Policy Development and Review, Research, Statistics, and Treasurer's 
Department All of the above departments work with Area Departments to 
enhance the operation of the IMF and in preparing report for IMF's Executive Board .. 
The economic departments that provide extra information and enhance the closer 
relationship with different members. It includes External Relations Department, 
Office in Office in Geneva, Office for. Asia and the Pacific, and 
Fund Office United Nations. 
3 that do the administrative work related to the daily operations in the 
organization. They include Human Resources Department, Department, 
Technology and General Services Department 
9 
(5) 
functions through 
International Monetary 
exchange 
exchange value of its TYlr\"p,u 
The advantage the 
disadvantage is 
value called dirty float. 
members' 
monitor them. 
situation 
The 
act 
it 
participates in different 
the major 
Hn,!H'CI'-'! countries. Currently, the 
own method in determining the 
to a wide range of exchange rate fluctuating. 
the real value of the currency. In contrast, the 
their market through controlling the currency 
this system requires greater transparency of its 
for the International Monetary Fund to 
Monetary Fund appraises its members' foreign 
to the framework of analysis of the general economic 
International Monetary Fund acts as a consultant to each 
to eliminate the imposed 
to other. It strongly recommends to 
conditions for public or nM"~lcp r-.nT'~Tlf"'1 
~~.'~.n.~ the International Financial 
World bCj[)D()InJIC Outlook, and other economic-related research n~r,prc 
each 
of the International Monetary Fund provides rt"l"l<'""" 
financial assistance includes credits and loans 
members with balance of payment problems in supporting policies 
member country can immediately withdraw 
10 
l1C11'lmp"r and 
quotas that already paid to the International Monetary Fund. The country can borrow 
more capital from the Fund if the initial amount is not enough. They can borrow 
cumulatively three times of what they paid as a quota SUbscription within a year. The 
borrower supposes to return the borrowing amount as soon as possible in order to 
maintain the fund available for the future use. One of the reasons for its members in 
borrowing is spending more than it takes. Therefore, country should have certain kind of 
financial policy reform in order to improve the unfavorable situation. The service charge 
for the borrower is ~ of 1 percent of the amount borrowed and interest charge is 4 12 
percent. 
The fourth role of the International Monetary Fund provides technical assistance 
to its member. The technical assistance includes expertise and support provided through 
its several broad area such as design and implementation of fiscal and monetary policy, 
the Singapore Training Institute, and other different programs. 
The fifth important role of the International Monetary Fund is having the power to 
issue the asset called the Special Drawing Right (SDR), which is a basket currency 
comprising major individual currency, that its members can add to the holdings of foreign 
currencies and gold they keep in their central banks. This allows its members to do 
transactions among themselves or with the International Monetary Fund in foreign 
exchange or payments. 
11 
We "l"\"""r~'t1 di fferent areas in statutory purposes, 
quotas, and voting, organization and operations, and role and functions 
Fund. In general, the llCH1VUCJ.l Monetary Fund acts International H.L'J"~""'" 
ordinary money or credit union that tnt""""" to borrowers and "''''IJ'''''''' 
borrowers return on ......... ..,1",..,<> with interest as soon as UV,''''H''''''. In 
Monetary Fund, 
When countries 
borrowers are different and all its members act as a 
that the borrowers 
and structures. In 
Internati onal 
reform 
structures with 
and South Korea 
financial assistance, the International Monetary Fund believes 
financial difficulties 
the return from 
countries will 
poor fmancial 
the agreements 
to improve the current inappropriate regulations 
return. The bailout to Thailand, Indonesia, 
Asian Financial Crisis 1997 98, for example, which 
will present in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. All of these bailout programs were associated 
with provisions that 
economic performance 
Financial Crisis. 
need to strictly follow. 
Asian region 
12 
ten 
B, I will 
before the 
Section B 
Overview of Asian Economy from 1987 to 1996 
the decade, a set Asian economy was at an 
extraordinary rate. This extraordinary rate was, basically, because of 
financial policies and the increasing of the to the 
Western World2• In addition, the World allowed large amount of capital flows 
toward Hpy'pnt Asian rate of return was much higher than 
"'v'u" ..... countries the world. Consequently, most of the countries 
had its growth rate as much as twice over the Western developed "",,, ..... '1".-. 
In Section, I will present macroeconomic and financial factors that 
H ....... """,'" the extraordinary growth Asian eco,nOln from 1987 - 96. factors 
included: (1) GDP growth rate; (2) inflation (3) unemployment rate; (4) stock 
market indices; (5) import, export, and balance; (6) interest rate; and (7) 
rate. AU the data are International Financial 
Development Bank, and Datastream. 
(1) GDP Growtb Rate 
the period of 1 - 96, the economy perfonnance of the Asian In 
had outperfonned the other developing countries, such as the of Africa, 
Middle and As the of all regions of developing 
countries, it outperfonned the category "''',.,.,-'''" ... GDP 
k",j-,'~"'''.n Industrial Category 1987 presented Table 1.1, 
2 HelliweU (1996) 
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the percentage change over previous year. average GDP of the 
developing countries catlel!O'n was 2.7 per annum more than the category of 
Industrial ('n''''t'ltrl In the period 1991 to 1 the average growth of the 
countries was much than the growth industrial 
Table 1.1 
Average GDP growth between Industrial and Developing Category, 1987 -1996 
over year) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 AVE 
3.4 4.1 4.0 5.6 6.4 5.5 6.2 5.1 
3.2 2.1 1.1 1.7 2.9 2.2 2.5 2.4 
0.2 2.0 2.9 3.9 3.5 3.3 3.7 2.7 
Source: International Financial Statistics 1999. 
Within the category developing which included region of 
Middle and Western Hemisphere, the most outstanding economy performance 
was the Asian region. average in the regIOn Developing countries 
from 1987 96 presented Table 1.2, which percentage change over previous 
growth of the Asian region was percent per annum, which was 
5.61 neI'cmU per annum more than the Africa regllOn, 3.69 percent annum 
more than average of Middle region, percent annum more than 
average of Hemisphere region. The only '-'A\_'-'U'UU'H was the j,YHUUJ ... East region, 
which had its average growth greater Asian region 1990. 
From above UC1TIOnSlra1:lOn it clearly that the eCCm01TI growth 
regIon ......... .u ... 5 the 1987 - 96 than the Developing 
countries category, and is much faster than growth rate Industrial countries 
category. the of the rp.-.",,,, is starting at a very low 
14 
and the total GDP of the Asian region contributes to the world is less than a quarter of the 
world's total GDp3. Countries started with lower incomes will grow faster relative to the 
initial richer countries because of the effect of convergence4 . Therefore, the Asian 
countries are following the trend of having high growth rate because of the low-income 
base when comparing with other countries in the world. 
Table 1.2 
Average GDP growth in the region of Developing countries, 1987 -1996 
(% change over previous year) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
iAfrica 1.9 5.0 3.0 2.9 1.3 -0.8 0.9 2.8 
Asia 7.8 9.2 5.6 5.6 6.2 8.9 8.4 9.2 
Middle East 4.5 0.8 1.7 8.2 5.9 4.8 3.7 3.2 
Western Hemisphere 3.2 0.8 1.8 2.4 3.6 2.7 4.3 4.7 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1999. 
1995 1996 
2.0 NA 
8.6 7.8 
3.5 5.3 
0.9 3.5 
Within the Asian region, I select ten of them to be my observed sample in order to 
identifY the extraordinary growth. The ten countries in the region are: China, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
Thailand. Obviously, these countries, except Japan, achieved enormous growth within 
the period of 1987 - 96. These countries categorize into four categories. The first 
category is Japan as an industrial country. The second category is China because of its 
population size. The third category is NIE includes Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, 
and Taiwan. The fourth category is ASEAN-4 includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand. 
Table 1.3 presented the average GDP growth rate of Japan, China, NIE, and 
ASEAN-4, in percentage change over previous year, from 1987 - 96. The growth rates of 
NIE were always outperforming the Japan as whole. Within the sample period, Hong 
3 Helliwell (1999) 
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AVE 
2.11 
7.72 
4.03 
2.71 
Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan had average growth rate of 2.79 percent per annum, 
5.92 percent per annum, 5.24 percent per annum, and 3.39 percent per annum over the 
Japan growth rate respectively. Since, the average GDP growth rate of Japan was around 
1 percent per annum from 1992 to 1995. Therefore, NIE growth rate outperformed 
Japan's growth rate. In China, the average growth rate was 10.04 percent per annum, 
which was higher than the growth rate of ASEAN-4 countries, which the average growth 
rate of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand were 6.91 percent per annum, 
8.51 percent per annum, 3.71 percent per annum, and 9.49 percent per annum 
respectively. In China, the growth rate dropped tremendous during 1989 and 1990 after 
the Tiannamen Square event. Then, it bounced back again in 1991. In the Philippines, 
the growth rate was -0.6 percent per annum in 1991 and 0.3 percent per annum in 1992, 
then it bounced back after 1993. The growth rates of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, 
were always between 7 percent per annum and 9.5 percent per annum. Hence, the 
average GDP growth rate of China and ASEAN-4 countries were also higher than 
Japan's average GDP growth rate. Exhibit 1.3 illustrated a better view on comparison of 
average GDP growth among all four categories in the Asian region with the world 
average. 
From the above ten countries that I observed, all of them had higher GDP growth 
rate than the world average, except Japan. According to Rhower (1995), the expectation 
of Asian economy will produce 40 percent of the world's GDP while US and European is 
18 percent and 14 percent respectively. Before the Asian Financial Crisis, the GDP 
growth rate of the Asia region was higher rate than the world average. 
4 Helliwell (1999) 
5 Rohwer (1995) 
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Table 1.3 
Average GDP growth rate of Japan, China, NIE, and ASEAN - 4,1987 - 1996 
(% change over previous year) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
~apan 4.1 6.2 4.7 4.8 3.8 1.0 0.3 0.6 1.5 
1996 AVE 
3.9 3.09 
China 11.6 11.3 4.1 3.8 9.2 14.2 13.5 12.7 10.5 9.5 10.04 
Hong Kong 13.0 8.0 2.6 3.4 
~ingapore 9.7 11.6 9.6 9.0 
Korea 11.5 11.3 6.4 9.5 
~aiwan NA NA NA NA 
Indonesia 4.9 5.8 7.5 7.2 
Malaysia 5.4 8.8 9.2 9.7 
Philippines 4.3 6.8 6.2 3.0 
Thailand 9.5 13.3 12.2 11.6 
World 3.9 4.5 3.3 2.9 
NA: Not available 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1999. 
In exception, Taiwan, from Asian Development Bank. 
Exhibit 1.3 
5.1 6.3 6.1 5.4 
7.3 6.3 10.4 10.4 
9.1 5.1 5.8 8.6 
7.6 6.8 6.3 6.5 
7.0 6.5 6.5 7.5 
8.6 7.8 8.3 9.2 
-0.6 0.3 2.1 4.4 
8.6 8.1 8.4 8.9 
2.3 3.2 2.9 4.3 
Average GDP growth of Japan, China, NIE, and ASEAN-4, 1987 -1996 
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Year 
(2) Inflation Rate 
3.9 5.0 
8.8 7.0 
8.9 7.1 
6.0 5.7 
8.2 8.0 
9.5 8.6 
4.8 5.8 
8.8 5.5 
3.5 3.9 
---,-China 
__ Japan 
NIE 
5.88 
9.01 
8.33 
6.48 
6.91 
8.51 
3.71 
9.49 
3.47 
--*-- ASEAN-4 
~World 
Table 1.4 showed a clear picture of the inflation rate of the ten sample countries 
in the Asian region from 1987 to 1996. It showed the ten sample countries with a 
relatively low and constant inflation rate annually within the sample period. Five 
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countries, included Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Thailand, had inflation rate 
either around or below 5 percent per year. The other four countries, which included 
Hong Kong, Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines, had inflation rate between 5 to 10 
percent per annum. The inflation rate of China was around 12 percent per annum. 
Although the inflation rate was relatively low and constant in general, they had 
some exceptions in China, Hong Kong, and the Philippines. In China, the inflation rate 
was over 15 percent from 1988 to 1989, and then it decreased below 5 percent from 1990 
to 1992. The inflation rate rose to 14 percent, 24 percent, and 16 percent for 1993, 1994, 
and 1995 respectively. Finally, it dropped around 8 percent in 1996. In Hong Kong, the 
inflation rate of 1991 is around 11 percent, and then it decreased continuously and finally 
at 6.3 percent in 1996. In the Philippines, the inflation rate was around 12 percent, 14 
percent, and 18 percent for 1989, 1990, and 1991. Then, it decreased around 7.5 percent 
to 9 percent on the year from 1992 to 1996. 
Table 1.4 
Inflation rate of Japan, China, NIE, and ASEAN-4, 1987 -1996 
(o/i h .) o c ange over preVIOUS year 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Japan 0.1 0.7 2.3 3.1 
Qhina 7.2 18.7 18.3 3.1 
Hong Kong NA NA NA NA 
Singapore 0.5 1.5 2.3 3.5 
Korea 3.0 7.1 5.7 8.6 
!Taiwan NA NA NA NA 
Indonesia 9.3 8.0 6.4 7.8 
Malaysia 0.3 2.6 2.8 2.6 
Philippines 3.8 8.8 12.2 14.1 
Irhailand 2.5 3.8 5.4 6.0 
NA: Not avadable 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1999. 
In exception, Taiwan, from Asian Development Bank. 
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3.3 1.7 1.3 0.7 -0.1 1.7 
3.5 6.3 14.6 24.2 16.9 8.3 
11.6 9.3 8.5 7.8 9.0 6.3 
3.4 2.3 2.3 3.1 1.7 1.4 
9.3 6.2 4.8 6.2 4.5 4.9 
3.6 4.5 2.9 4.1 3.8 3.0 
9.4 7.5 12.5 9.6 9.0 6.6 
4.4 4.8 3.5 3.7 5.3 3.5 
18.7 8.9 7.6 9.1 8.1 8.4 
5.7 4.1 3.4 5.0 5.8 5.8 
(3) Unemployment rate 
The unemployment rates of the sample countries were extremely low. Nearly 
most of their unemployment rate was around 2 to 4 percent per annum. In exception, the 
Philippines unemployment rate was around 9 percent annually. Malaysia started with 7 
percent in 1987 and declined to 2 percent in 1996. Table 1.5 presented the overview of 
the unemployment rate of the sample Asian countries from 1987 - 96. Note that the 
Taiwan data of unemployment rate is not available upon my resources. 
Table 1.5 
Unemployment rate of Japan, China, NIE, and ASEAN 4, 1987 -1996 
(Period average in %) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Wapan 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.2 
China 2.0 2.0 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.9 
Hong Kong 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.9 3.2 
Singapore 4.7 3.3 3.2 1.7 1.9 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.7 
Korea 3.1 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.8 2.4 2.0 
Taiwan NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Indonesia 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 4.4 NA 
Mal~sia 7.3 7.2 6.3 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.0 2.9 2.8 
Philippines 9.1 8.3 8.4 8.1 9.0 9.8 9.3 9.5 9.5 
Thailand 5.9 3.1 1.4 2.2 2.7 1.4 1.5 NA NA 
NA : Not avallable 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1999. 
(4) Stock Market Indices 
1996 
3.4 
3.0 
2.8 
3.0 
2.0 
NA 
NA 
2.6 
NA 
NA 
Table 1.6 reported the performance of different countries' stock market indexes. 
The majority of the stock market indexes were in the upward, increasing trend. These 
countries included China (Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite price index), Hong Kong 
(Hang Seng price index), Singapore (Singapore Straits Times (new) price index), 
Indonesia (Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite price index), Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur 
Composite price index), and the Philippines (Philippines Stock Exchange Composite 
price index). The performance of Japan (Nikkei 225 Stock Average price index) market 
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increased from 21,564 points in 1987 to 38,916 in 1989, then it declined to 23,916 in 
1990 and to 19,361 in 1996. For Taiwan (Taiwan Stock Exchange Weighted price 
index), it rose to 9,624 in 1989, then dropped to 4,530 points in 1990, bounced back to 
6,000 points in 1993, and ended at 7,000 points in 1996. Korea (Korea Stock Exchange 
Composite (KOSPI) price index) market increased from 518 in 1987 to 1,027 in 1994, 
then it declined to 651 in 1996. Thailand (Bangkok S.E.T. price index) market started at 
285 in 1987. It rose to 1,360 in 1994 then ended at 832 in 1996. 
According to the perfonnance of stock market, we observed that the Asian stock 
exchange markets were in the bull market for nearly ten years, in exception of Japan, 
Taiwan, Korea, and Thailand stock market. 
Table 1.6 
St kId oc n exes 0 fJ apan, ChO NIE d ASEAN 4 1987 1996 IDa, , an - , -
1987 
~apan 21,564 
China N/A 
Hong Kong 2,303 
Singapore 688 
Korea 518 
Taiwan 2,340 
Indonesia 83 
Malaysia 261 
Philippines 813 
Thailand 285 
NA : Not available 
Source: DataStream. 
1988 1989 1990 
30,159 38,91j5 23,849 
N/A N/A N/A 
2,687 2,837 3,025 
854 1,166 947 
907 910 696 
5,119 9,624 4,530 
305 399 418 
357 562 506 
847 1,105 651 
381 879 613 
(5) Import, Export and Trade Balance 
1991 1992 1993 
22,984 16,925 17,417 
293 780 834 
4,297 5,512 12,086 
1,215 1,240 2,112 
610 678 879 
4,601 3,377 6,071 
247 274 590 
556 644 1,289 
1,152 1,256 3,272 
711 89] 1,683 
1994 1995 
19,723 19,868 
648 555 
8,191 10,073 
1,854 1,917 
1,027 883 
7,111 5,159 
470 514 
971 995 
2,798 2,594 
1,360 1,281 
The trade balance represents the net exports, either total amount of exports minus 
total amount of imports. When trade balance is in deficit, which implies the country 
import more than export, this led to trade imbalance that its trading partners will have 
trade surplus. The situation can be vice versa if the country export more than import. 
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1996 
19,361 
917 
13,451 
1,992 
651 
6,934 
637 
1,238 
3,17jJ 
832 
When trade deficit continuously, this win exert pressure on the country currency to 
depreciate in order to have higher export and decrease import, either competitiveness. 
Table 1.7 showed the trend of the trade balance through 1987 - 96. Within the 
sample, only Japan, Taiwan, and Indonesia had positive trade balance throughout the 
sample period. Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand had negative trade balance 
throughout the ten years. China had four years trade deficit from 1987 - 89 and 1993. 
Hong Kong, after the 0.01 billions US dollar trade surplus, the following nine years were 
in trade deficit with the amount of 17.8 billions US dollar at the end of 1996. In Korea, 
the situation was similar to Hong Kong, the trade deficit started in 1990 and the amount 
of 20.62 billions of US dollar at the end of 1996. In Malaysia, the trade balance were 
stable with a range from -4 billions to 6 billions US dollar in surplus. Overall, seven out 
often Asian countries experienced in trade deficit. 
Table 1.7: 
Trade balance in Japan, China, NIE, and ASEAN -4,1987 -1996 
(Billions of US Dollars) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 
Japan 80.25 77.48 64.22 52.21. 
China -3.78 -7.75 -6.60 8.75 
.Hong Kong 0.01 -0.73 0.98 -0.33 
Singapore -3.87 -4.56 -5.00 -8.15 
.Korea 6.26 8.89 0.91 -4.83 
!Taiwan 18.68 10.73 13.58 12.31 
Indonesia 4.77 5.97 5.80 3.84 
Malaysia 5.24 4.56 2.58 0.16. 
Philippines -1.50 -1.69 -3.42 -4.97 
!Thailand -1.37 -4.33 -5.69 -10.31 
Source: InternatIOnal Fmancial Statistics Yearbook, 1999. 
In exception, Taiwan, from Asian Development Bank. 
(6) Interest Rate 
1991 1992 1993 
77.79 106.64 120.62 
8.12 4.36 -12.12 
-1.66 -3.92 -3.41 
-7.27 -8.70 -11.22 
-9.66 -5.14 -1.56 
13.04 9.21 7.58 
3.27 6.69 8.50 
-2.30 0.79 1.47 
-4.02 -5.70 -7.67 
-9.16 -8.21 -9.15 
1994 1995 
121.77 107.23 
5.37 19.68 
-10.44 -19.00 
-5.84 -6.24 
-6.33 -10.06 
7.34 7.89 
8.07 4.79 
-0.76! -3.74 
-9.24 -10.84 
-9.2~ -14.34 
Table 1.8 presented the average interest rate of the ten observed Asia countries. 
In Japan, the average interest rate ranged between 0.50 percent in 1995 and 1996 to 6.00 
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1996 
61.75 
12.25 
-17.80 
-6.32 
-20.62 
14.44 
6.89 
-0.10 
-13.71 
-5.42 
percent in 1990, which were extremely low. In China, the average interest rate was 
around 7 percent to 10.50 percent in the sample period. In the category of NIE, the 
average interest rate fluctuated around 2 percent from 1987 - 96. For the ASEAN-4 
countries, Indonesia interest rate was around 18 percent in 1990 and 1991, and then it 
dropped to 12 percent to 13 percent in the following years. In Malaysia, the average 
interest rate was below 5 percent in 1987, 1988, and 1989, and then rose to 7 percent in 
1990, 1991, and 1992. The average interest rate was ranged 4 percent to 7 percent from 
1993 to 1996. The Philippines with average interest rate around 1 ° percent to 14 percent 
and Thailand average interest rate was around 8 percent to 12 percent. 
Table 1.8 
Average interest rate of Japan, China, NIE, and ASEAN- 4, 1987 -1996 
(end of period % per annum) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Wapan 2.50 2.50 4.25 6.00 4.50 3.25 1.75 1.75 
~hina NA NA NA 7.92 7.20 7.20 10.08 10.08 
Hong Kong NA NA NA NA NA 4.00 4.00 5.75 
~ingapore * 3.89 4.30 5.34 6.61 4.76 2.74 2.50 3.68 
Korea 7.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 5.00 5.00 
Taiwan NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Indonesia NA NA NA 18.83 18.47 13.50 8.82 12.44 
Malaysia 3.20 4.12 4.89 7.23 7.70 7.10 5.24 4.51 
Philippines 10.00 10.00 12.00 14.00 14.00 14.30 9.40 8.30 
Thailand 8.00 8.00 8.00 12.00 11.00 11.00 9.00 9.50 
NA: Not aVailable 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1999. 
* Money market rate, others are Central Bank Discount rate. 
1995 1996 
0.50 0.50 
10.44 9.00 
6.25 6.00 
2.56 2.93 
5.00 5.00 
NA NA 
13.99 12.80 
6.47 7.28 
10.83 11.70 
10.50 10.50 
In supplement, for each of the country portfolio, they had an average interest rate 
in the trend of two directions, increasing and decreasing within the sample period. In 
exception of Japan, it had extremely low average interest rate 
Base on the interest rate parity (IRP) that if the countries control their interest rate 
within certain range, the currency exchange rate will also within certain range without 
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large amount of fluctuation due to the forward rate of the currency is keeping in a 
predictable manner. In addition, when the central bank keeps the interest rate steady, this 
will increase the incentives of borrowing money to do investment. This is because the 
borrowers can have a better foresight of the interest expense in the future. Hence, this 
will enhance the economic situation indirectly. 
(7) Excbange Rate 
In our sample countries, each of them has different currency exchange rate policy. 
In Japan (Yen) and the Philippines (Peso), the exchange rate arrangement is in the fonn 
of more flexible and independently floating. In China (Yuan), Indonesia (Rupiah), Korea 
(Won), Malaysia (Ringgit), Taiwan (New Taiwan Dollar), and Singapore (Singapore 
Dollar), their exchange rate policy is in the more flexible other managing floating, such 
as real exchange rate targeting. Hong Kong (Hong Kong Dollar) pegs to US dollars and 
Thailand (Baht) pegs to other composite with various baskets of currencies. 
In Table 1.9, the data of the exchange rate for the sample presented in tenns of 
country currency per US dollars. The Japanese Yen appreciated throughout ten years, it 
started from 144 to 1 US dollar in 1987 and ended up at 109 to 1 US dollar in 1996. The 
Chinese Yuan depreciated from 3.7 to 1 US dollar in 1987 to 8.4 to 1 US dollar in 1996. 
In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong dollar pegged to the US dollar in the range of7.70 to 7.80 
per US dollar. The Singapore dollar appreciated from 2.11 per US dollar in 1987 to 1.41 
per US dollar in 1996. In Korea, the Won appreciated from 1987 to 1990 (from 825 Won 
per US dollar to 670 Won per US dollar), and then depreciated in 1991 to 1993 (from 700 
Won per US dollar to nearly 800 Won per US dollar), finally the Won was quoted 
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between narrow ranges from 800 won to 700 won US dollar. the 
was targeted to within the range of NTD to 27 NTD dollar. 
Indonesia Rupiah from 1600 rupiah in 1987 to rupiah in 1 
Malaysia managed to within the range of Ringgit US dollar in 1987 
and Ringgit per dollar in 1996. The Philippines Peso fluctuated between 1 
and 1995, and then in the range Peso per dollar in 1994, 1 and 
1996. Baht between 25.10 and 25.80 per US dollar the whole 
oo.l""V"1" period. 
Table 1.9 
Exchange rate Japan, China, NIE, 
(country's currency to US Dollar, 
1987 1988 1989 
NA: Not Available 
2.62 
21.10 
25.21 
Source"" International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1999. 
In Taiwan. from Asian Development Bank. 
From above, each country exchange rate in a certain 
or e'P1~eCllatf~s in terms of the (except "OJ"""""'''' Yen). These 
to be more attractive to nation investors to invest in their country UI:i\',(lU;:,1:i ofthe low 
currency or the cost is comparative cheaper than countries. 
can attract foreigners to into their it alters exchange 
rate that reflects economic situation. In addition, it is ..... F>"'''' ..... the auto-adjustment 
24 
1996 
108.78 
8.31 
7.73 
1.41 
804.45 
of the balance of payment through the currency market. According to interest rate parity 
relationship in foreign exchange market, when interest rate increase, the value of the 
home currency will depreciate in the financial market is in equilibrium. In reality, the 
currencies did not depreciate in the market during 10 years period because of the fixed or 
targeting exchange rate for some Asian countries. This implies governments had certain 
policies to control the exchange rate in order to have a favorable situation for foreign 
investors. 
Summary 
From the above, we concluded that the common economic and financial features 
among the sample Asian countries that contributed to the enormous growth in Asia. 
These factors which included with high GDP growth rate, relatively low and constant 
inflation rate, low unemployment rate, "bull" market in stock exchange, high trade 
imbalance, predictable interest rate, and fixed exchange rate against US dollar. All of 
these show the positive signal to the Asian economic, except the high trade imbalance. 
As the trend of extraordinary growth continuous, why the Asian Financial Crisis 
happened in 1997? What are the major reasons changed the growth trends into reverse 
directions with negative growth rate after 1997? Chapter 2 will answer these questions 
accordingly. 
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Chapter 2 
Roles of IMF during the Asian Financial Crisis 
Chapter 1 provides us an overview of the International Monetary Fund and the 
Asian countries' economic perfonnance before the Asian Financial Crisis. Before the 
onset of the Crisis, the economic background in Asian countries had a solid, fast, and 
optimistic growth through several decades after the World War II. For instance, the 
economic growth rate of last ten years, averagely, was doubled the Industrial countries 
according to the findings in Chapter 1. In these optimistic and healthy economic 
environments among the Asian countries, except Japan, why the Asian Financial Crisis 
occurred? In addition, what is the role of International Monetary Fund during the Asian 
Financial Crisis? I will clarify these questions in this chapter through two sections. 
Section A will make a brief summary of all major events occurred during the 
Asian Financial Crisis from 1997 to 1998. Within this section, it will cover the 
International Monetary Fund responses to different Asian countries. In particular, 
announcements to Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea, and 
the specific bailout programs for Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea. The details of 
each bailout programs will discuss in Chapter 3. Section B will dissect the causes of the 
Asian Financial Crisis in conducting a survey of different related arguments and 
viewpoints from different economists and financial analysts. 
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Section A 
Chronology of Asian Financial Crisis from 1997 to 1998 
In the 
the future eC(JnC)ml 
Within 
1998, the Asian ~~,...""' ...... " was turmoil. The AV .... "'''t 
prtnt'Tn~n"l"'p changed to pessimistic within 
it many critical events that contribute to the causes 
bailout programs that granted by the International Monetary Fund during the 
entities involved into 
Philippines, 
which included the lnterrlatIonal Monetary Fund, 
South Kong, 
major international 
In the following, I through these major events three periods: (I) period 
the Crisis (from 1997 to June 1997), (2) during the Crisis (from 
July 1997 to January 1998), (3) period ofre-evaluation bailout programs 
details based on 
Journal, New 
1998 to December 
from 
All of the following 
news sources, included ... ""11."',.<,, 
Times, CNNfn, Financial 
and its Global 
Bloomberg, and ",u.<v."v,...,'<::' 
by Roubini. 
of the Asian Currency 
(1) Period before tbe Crisis (January 1997 to June 1997) 
to 
In the period ..,PTEV,.", 
onset of the Crisis. 
to the International 
The first major event 
government reneged on 
events that led 
events occurred in Thailand and only one event 
Fund. 
to Thailand was, which on March 10, the 
to buy back billion in bad property debt 
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who was the from financial institutions. On the same day, 
International Monetary Fund Managing Director, YP.C1 .... "'Y./'1 not see the reason 
for the crisis to develop further. on May 14-1 rrPI't"v (Baht) was 
""' ...... ,,<>.v'U. massively by speculators because of 
instability. Thailand and Singapore jointly 
same month, Thailand failed to save 
political 
the 
One, 
lJe(:arrle more obvious. On June, the Thailand's finance 
and Thai Central Bank suspended operation of 
that lead to the expectations of the Thailand's will 
of political and banking system further instability. 
(2) Period during the Crisis (July 1997 to January 1998) 
Within this period, most of the major events and announcements to 
Monetary Fund, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
lnterrlatlon:al Monetary Fund provided three independent bailout 
Indonesia, and South Korea within this period respectively without 
identify problems and construct appropriate agreement policies. 
to 
III 
<U.""UJ'U""'H with terms and regulations, which requires each country to foHow, will 
countries' stock markets and foreign exchange 
were not heavily affected by the events occurred in Thailand before July 1997. 
abandoned its managed currency float on July 2, which marked as the 
the changing the situations dramatically. From July 2 to the end of 
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January 1998, the Asian countries' stock markets, foreign exchange market, and interest 
rate crashed. We define this period as the core Crisis period with the International 
Monetary Fund played an important role in the four Asia courtiers, included Thailand, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and South Korea. These countries associated with the highest 
exposure to the Crisis than other Asian countries. 
IMF and Thailand 
On July 2, the Bank of Thailand announced a managed float of the Baht that they 
give up the intervention of its currency. In addition, Thai called to the International 
Monetary Fund for "technical assistance". This day is considered the trigger event of the 
Asian Financial Crisis. After the announcement of Thailand, the Baht effectively 
devalued by about 15 - 20 percent with a record low of28.80 to one US dollar. On July 
28, Thailand called in the International Monetary Fund for technical assistance. The 
second Asian country asked for help from International Monetary Fund after the 
Philippines in extension of Extended Fund Facility (EFF). The Philippines program not 
considered as one of the bailout programs provided by the International Monetary Fund 
in this literature. 
On August 5, Thailand unveiled austerity plan and followed the International 
Monetary Fund rescue package with suggested policies. The Central Bank suspended 48 
finance firms. Six days later, on August 11, the International Monetary Fund announced 
the rescue package for Thailand included loans totaling in 16 billion US dollar from the 
International Monetary Fund and other Asian nations. On August 20, the International 
Monetary Fund approved a 3.9 billion US dollar credit for Thailand. At this moment, the 
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rescue package is 16.7 billion 
official bailout package "''''''''F'.1'''''' 
with detail regulations and 
detail regulations 
On 
modification to the 
ask the International 
package and its 
bailout package. 
IMF and 
The same 
the Philippines 
announcement 
11, 
Philippines 
as 
total. Thailand rescue package is the first 
International Monetary Fund to Asian region 
Thailand required following aU of 
Monetary Fund 
On ----.-J 1998, Thailand announced that it would 
to ease the terms of its 17.2 billion US dollar 
The country asked for easing terms in 
abandoned its intervention of its on July 
to intervene heavily in defending 
Monetary Fund during this period was on July 
allowed the Peso to move 
nternaltIonal Monetary Fund va'_A"' .... 
a 
announcement against the 
from Managing Director would 
Monetary Board to approve the Philippines' request in an \JAI,\JU'UVU 
Facility On the International Monetary Fund 1"\1'1'''''~'l1 
the Asian Financial Crisis. The Philippines 
billion US dollar financial support under the fast-track 
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nXl[emlea Fund 
program to 
almost 1.1 
IMF and Malaysia 
Later of the week after Thai Baht devalued, On July 8, Malaysia Central Bank 
forced to intervene heavily in defending its Ringgit. On the same day as the International 
Monetary Fund offered the US$l.l billion financial support to the Philippines, on July 
14, Malaysia Central Bank abandoned the defense of Ringgit. On July 24, Malaysia 
Ringgit hit 38-month low of 2.6530. On September 20, Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad told currency trading was immoral and should be stopped during the 
IMFlWorld Bank annual conference, held in Hong Kong. Between the International 
Monetary Fund and Malaysia, Malaysia did not receive any support programs from 
International Monetary Fund and was the only country with high exposure during the 
Asian Financial Crisis without support program. 
Upon the end on July 1997, the currency of Thailand Baht, the Philippines Peso, 
Singapore Dollar and Malaysia Ringgit had already abandoned the intervention or peg of 
their currency and with a high depreciation rate against US dollar. In addition, the 
Thailand crisis spread to other Asian countries and became the Asian Financial Crisis. 
IMF and Indonesia 
On August 14, Indonesia allowed its currency in the floating rate. The Rupiah 
plunged to 2,755 against US dollar with high interest rate. On October 8, Indonesia 
announced to ask the International Monetary Fund for financial assistance. At the end of 
October, the International Monetary Fund provided 23 billion US dollar financial support 
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package to Indonesia. This is the second bailout package assigned to the Asian region, 
which the details of bailout package will cover in Chapter 3. 
On November 6, the International Monetary Fund Managing Director said that the 
package for Indonesia should break the viscious cycle of economic destabilization in 
Asia. Later on December 8 - 9, rumors that president Suharto is gravely ill and sending 
the Rupiah into a tailspin. Since then, the initial bailout program did not implement 
effectively. After several negotiations and clarifications, on January 15, 1998 and 
January 27, 1998, President Suharto announced a wide-range economic reform that 
would overturn the current economic situations. This reform, with modification on the 
initial program, restored confidence in its banking sector, guarantied commercial bank 
obligations and allowed overseas investment in local banks. In particular, the 
International Monetary Fund's bailout programs established. 
Upon the end of August, Indonesia Rupiah was forced to abandon the fixed 
exchange rate and with the high depreciation rate. In total, six countries' currencies 
already affected by the Crisis. 
IMF and South Korea 
On November 6,1997, the Bank of Korea once again intervened in attempting to 
halt the local currency slide versus the US Dollar. On November 17, South Korea 
abandoned its defense of the Won and aftermath the currency smashing through the 
I,OOOIUS Dollar level. At first, South Korea tried to handle the problems through 
reforming the countries banking sectors. On November 14, the majority parties vowed to 
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pass a reform package to clean up debt-ridden banks. Unfortunately, the Financial 
Reform Bills was unable to pass on November 18. On November 20, the South Korea 
Won fell 10 percent in one trading day. Next day, November 21, South Korea asked a 
rescue package from the International Monetary Fund. On December 4, 1997, a recorded 
loan package led by the International Monetary Fund assigned to South Korea, which 
bailout program details will provide in Chapter 3. On December 15, the International 
Monetary Fund board meeting in Washington, D.C. considered a speed delivery of a 
portion of the 60 billion US dollar bailout program, which 2 billion US dollar will 
available to South Korea on December 30 and another 2 billion US dollar available on 
January 8, 1998. After the major US and European banks announced that they would 
allow South Korean customers more time to payoff their debts and Korea government 
proposed to issue 25 billion US dollar in bonds Won. On January 29, Korea government 
and global creditors agreed to exchange their debts with government guaranteed loans in 
a deal expected ending the Korea's liquidity crisis. 
Up to this point, the Asian Financial Crisis started from Thailand and then spread 
to the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and finally to South Korea. Within this Crisis, 
the above countries' currencies depreciated heavily. In addition, the International 
Monetary Fund granted three bailout programs to Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea. 
At that moment, the whole Asian economic was in a severe condition. 
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(3) Period of re-evaluation of the bailout programs (February 1998 to 
December 1998) 
As the International Monetary Fund bailout programs already assigned to 
different countries, Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea requested to change some of 
the terms and regulations that written on the agreement. This led to the new negotiations 
and clarifications on the agreements. In addition, these terms and regulations generated 
the political unclear and future economic instability during the Crisis, which increased 
the amount of uncertainty. 
IMF and Thailand 
As mentioned in the above section, Thailand requested the International Monetary 
Fund to ease the terms in the bailout package on January 6. On February 12, the 
International Monetary Fund relaxed a key condition of bailout program to have budget 
deficit of 1 to 2 percent of GDP instead of a surplus in 1 percent. In addition, it allowed 
in easing the high domestic interest rates. After this one, it had four more modifications 
on the program on February 24, May 26, August 25, and December 1 respectively. The 
details of these modifications will provide in Chapter 3. 
IMF and Indonesia 
On February, Indonesia tried to Impose a rigid currency regime that the 
International Monetary Fund, the United States, Germany, and Australia were all in 
opposition to such currency board that planned to create fixed exchange rate system for 
the Rupiah. The International Monetary Fund also threatened to withhold the further 
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money 
plan in 
On 
required an 
Fund and 
a billion US dollar bailout Finally, on February 21 -
TTP1,ru board was suspended from other lla.llUH". 
lUUJllI",",'a. said that the was not work 
plan. Because of the conflict the International Monetary 
International Monetary would delay the disbursement of 
funds to Indonesia. On April 8, the International Mcmetan Fund and Indonesia had 
targets. Through 
trouble with riots and 
reached an ~crt'pplm 
April and 
President 
25, 
on a new package of economic ... ",fr,,...,.. 
political situations in Indonesia were 
to from office of over 
delayed the 
as a president. On May 
next installment of a 
1 0 billion US dollar balance-of-payment loan, the reform package, and pending the 
reassessment political and economic situation. 
September 11, UC1[oDIer November 13 had 
on June 24, July 29, 
H ... ·" ... t modifications on the program 
respectively. 
IMF and 
Within 
... "", ...... " ofthese modifications will provide 
had four modifications with the initial 
program. The dates were February 7, May 2, July 24, and November 13 respectively. 
All the details of modifications will provide 
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Summary 
Overall, the 
Asian countries. 
were OT",nt~'rI the period to 
(n-,;"nH'n country gO'vernn:lentS tried to renegotiate with 
terms in the bailout iJU~d"""F."" created politic uncertainty. more detail 
Financial chronology was presented Appendix. As we ("\n,~pn]p"1 
all of the important events during the Crisis were to the International J.VJ.'.fH\.,\.U.l 
From 
Hc",~·", ... t Asian 
the causes of the Asian 
we had the VU'-'fiF,J. 
the Crisis. An of 
on what 
events stimulate the 
1'0.1.1\.01,<,", Crisis. In the following <"'''''",,,'''" I will conduct a 
of the causes of the Asian Financial Crisis. 
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Section B 
Survey of Causes of the Asian Financial Crisis 
The above section already discussed the chronology of the Asian Financial Crisis 
from 1997 to the end of 1998. Throughout this period, it had many critical events that 
deepened the wound of the Crisis. To understand the causes of the Asian Financial 
Crisis, we should use different aspects to analyze this issue. In this section, I conduct a 
survey of different economists' opinions about the causes of the Crisis . Through my 
survey, I conclude that seven major causes contributed to fonnation of the Crisis. 
Seven major causes of the Asian Financial Crisis 
Historically, the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis was on July 2, 1997 when 
Thailand let their currency into floating rate or gave up the peg currency policy. Before 
this time, as discussed in Chapter 1, the Asia economic was in a fast and strong economic 
growth. Why the Asian Financial Crisis occurred? There have seven major arguments 
on the causes of the Crisis that will discuss in the following. 
Cause I: The slowdown in output growth 
In different Asian countries, they experienced extraordinary growth within several 
decades. One of the major driven forces for the growth was the continuing increase input 
for productivity, such as the labor force growth and capital inflow from other countries, 
instead of improving output efficiency. In the World Bank Policy Research Bulletin 
(1993), it mentioned that the investment and rapidly growing human capital were the 
principal engines of growth. 
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According to the law of diminishing returns, on the hand, when the 
indefinitely the same quantity or without improving V.U .. L""_HV the output 
will increase sharply at the growth phase. When the output reaches a certain amount, it 
will increase at a eCI'eaSmg rate at 
Asian the several decades is the growth phase 
mCreaSlI1lg sharply, as shown in Exhibit 1.3, while input variables 
increasing sharply, When Asian countries reached the phase, obey 
diminishing returns. Therefore, Asian countries cannot keep its economy 
Within 
rate. The Myth of Asia's Miracle by Krugman (1994): 
"The newly industrializing countries of Asia, like the Union the 
have growth large part through an 
mobilization of resources. Once one accounts for the role of rapidly 
growing inputs in economics' growth, one finds little left to 
growth, like that of Soviet Union in its high-growth era, seems 
to be driven by extraordinary growth in inputs like labor capital 
than by gains in efficiency," (p.6) 
same it also concluded opinion as follow: 
"The basic conclusion is the same: there is startlingly evidence 
improvement in efficiency. and 
that the that 
during the postwar period carmot be 
Newly Industrialized f''''''nh .... '''''' " (p.7) 
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conclude of the 
no technical 
for four 
Asian 
Asian 
law 
at 
During the year of 1995 and 1996, the growth rate of GDP was increasing at a 
decreasing rate, which shows in Exhibit 1.3. In China, NIE, and ASEAN-4, the growth 
rate of GDP was increasing at a decreasing rate, which implied that the Asian countries 
were in the end period of diminishing returns. If further investing within this period 
without increasing in efficiency, the average rate of return of investments will be low or 
the marginal cost and average cost will increase. In addition, the ratio of foreign debt! 
GDP will also increase when the GDP decreases, this will lead to other macroeconomics 
problems such as currency depreciation, stock markets crash, non-performance loans, and 
even further a financial crisis, the statement below already indicated that the risk of 
outbreak of the Crisis in Asian countries. 
" . . . high economic growth may make an economy more vulnerable to a 
crisis. For instance, high growth rate may induce overly optimistic beliefs 
that the economic expansion will persist unabated in the future .... In such 
circumstances, as external shock that leads to a sudden change in 
expectations can cause a rapid reversal of capital flows and trigger a 
currency crisis." (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, What Caused the Asian 
Currency and Financial Crisis?, p.12) 
Cause II: The long-term current account imbalance 
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, most of the Asian countries in my observation, 
except Japan, Taiwan, and Indonesia, had trade deficit throughout the sample year from 
1987 - 1996. When we included the trade balance into the current account, the results of 
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the observed countries had large amount of the current account ""'C"U""'''_V in the 
year. 
The different Asian countries' current accounts 
2.1, note that the data for Hong Kong is not available. 
Japan and Taiwan with a consistence current account 
3 percent and 2 percent to 6 percent respectively. 
of current account surplus, on average over 1 0 percent per 
percent deficit. The current account of China 
a 
but within the range from negative 2 percent to positive 3 De]~CeJnt 
Malaysia, the year 1987, 1988, and 1989, the current account 
toward deficit, from 7 percent in 1987 decrease to 2 Tlp,·,..p,,,r 
from 8 percent in 1987 to 0.8 percent in 
account started in deficit and finally 
Malaysia the current account deficit was as 
4 n,..,-,...""nT in the following years, increased 
in Malaysia. 
as 8.6 percent in 1 
1995 
finally with 4.9 percent in 1996. Indonesia, 
had a consistent current account deficit throughout the sample 
on ""'''''r"{',,.. current account deficit was around 1 npl''''PlnT to 3 
it started with around 1 percent of GDP deficit, 
percent in 1990 and decreased to around 2 percent in 1991 and 1 
in the Table 
it indicated only 
of 1 percent to 
amount 
and 
current 
prT'p~'~Pt1 to 
again to over 5 percent in 1993 and 4 percent in 1994, finally 
percent in 1996. In Thailand, the first three years the current account "'''''''VA' was within 
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the of 0 to 3 percent of GDP. Since 1 on the current account deficit 
was 7 percent yearly and ended with 8.1 1996. 
Table 
1994 1995 1996 
1.38 1. 2.71 2.36 1.53 
3.09 3. 1.26 0.23 0.87 
8.33 11.29 11.38 7.57 16.12 16.81 15.65 
.44 -0.69 -2.83 -1.28 0.30 -1.02 -1.86 -4.75 
6.82 6.94 4.03 3.16 2.70 2.10 4.05 
-2.82 -3.65 -2.17 -1.33 -1.58 -3.18 -3.37 
-2.03 -8.69 -3.74 -4.66 -6.24 -8.43 -4.89 
-1.04 -3.53 -6.08 -2.28 -1.89 -5.55 -4.60 -2.67 -4.77 
-2.68 -3.46 -8.50 -7.71 -5.66 -5.08 -5.60 -8.06 -8.10 
above, we observed that most of the countries had current account 
deficit. When countries with strong growth rate in they did not have obvious 
problems of the growth rate compensate current account imbalance. 
the growth rate decreased as I, the problems became 
more Asian countries and developed into the Financial Crisis in 
1997. In the Asian countries with higher current account "'''''''I"'1T associated with 
. . 
higher depreciation its currency during the Crisis. the currency of 
Indonesia, the Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea 151 percent, 52 
percent, 78 and 105 percent respectively. vu' ........ u ... ,"" with smaller 
current account f1",,1"'I"',t did not suffer comparable ael)relClatlOI and 
Singapore U"'~Jl"'\,U>'LIVU about 15 percent gradually ~~.~_,...,.u~ 
"" ....... "' .. between currency np,."r",l' 
countries in the 1990s need not 
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prima facie suggests that current account problems may have played a role 
in the dynamics of the Asian meltdown." (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 
What Caused the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis?, p.8) 
According to the opinions of Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1998), it stated 
that the ongoing fiscal deficit could explain the cause of the Crisis, 
"The most natural alternatives explanation of the Southeast Asian 
currency crisis is that it reflected profligate fiscal policy: ongoing fiscal 
deficit led to sustained reserve losses and to the eventual abandonment of 
fixed exchange rates." (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, Prospective 
Deficits and the Asian Currency Crisis, p.2) 
Cause III: The Asian country currencies overvalued 
During the Crisis, the speculators had heavily attacked the Asian countries' 
currencies. Finally, the Central Bank forced to let their currencies to float freely during 
summer of 1997 because of foreign reserves exhausted. These events marked an abandon 
of the previous foreign exchange policy of tightly managing, or pegging, currencies 
against either US dollar or a basket of currencies, which each country currency system 
already mentioned in Chapter 1. Therefore, the value of currency exchange rate likely 
determined by the market. forces such as the macroeconomic factors after the 
abandonment. The fact is that the currency of Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Malaysia, and South Korea depreciated heavily. Taiwan and Singapore depreciated 
slightly. Nearly all of the currencies in Asian region depreciated during Crisis, except 
Hong Kong dollar that it defended their pegging to US dollar successfully. Because of 
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their 
overvalued. 
V"",""Uu.JN",v rate policy before Crisis, most of the Asian currencies were 
the Thai baht, rupiah Malaysia most 
prominently were overvalued on the eve of the ", in addition, "As 
of May 1997, the baht, the and were overvalued according to 
this criterion. While overvaluations are not large, they do appear to be 
persistent. .,. Interestingly, both methods 11Ull"o.",", that the won 
was undervalued even n""T ..... ,."" its recent discrete drop in " (Chinn, 
the Asian Currencies Overvalued?, I) 
Giancarlo 
Were 
Paolo Nouriel Roubini (1998) also argued 
exchange rate appreciation during 1990s. 
"Taking 1990 as the we observed by the of 1997 the 
rate had appreciated by 19% in Malaysia, in the 
Philippines, 12% in Thailand, 8% in Indonesia, 18% in Singapore, and 
in Hong Kong. Korea Taiwan, the currency III 
real terms (respectively by 1 and 10%). This suggests with 
important exception of Korea, all the currencies crashed in 1997 
experienced a real appreciation." (Corsetti, and Roubini, What 
Caused Asian Currency and Financial Crisis?, p.20) 
real 
Both of the suggested that the were overvalued before the 
Crisis, Korea won. Theoretically, a country 11"T.>nl'"\l appreciates, its 
will decrease import will increase that the balance of payment will to 
Then the exchange rate will adjust according to the theory of ... ~""' .. """'~ rate Since 
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most of the countries in Asia having tightly managing or pegging to other currencies in 
order to reduce currency risk for foreign investors, this adheres the market mechanism to 
self-adjust the exchange rate. The managing or pegging method of currency only 
postpones the current depreciation of the currency to the future. This real appreciation of 
currency helped to build the large amount of current account imbalances. In the same 
side, this also reflects the decrease competitiveness in Asian countries with respect to 
China of its increasing competitive position. 
"The resulting strong real appreciation helped build the region's large and 
growing current account imbalances." (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 
What Caused the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis?, p.21) 
Since 1995, the US dollar was becoming strong in respect to Japanese Yen was 
weak, so most of the Asian countries' export was decreasing because the goods were 
relative more expensive than Japan. These exert extra pressure to different Asian 
currencies to devalue in order to increase its competitiveness within the region. 
Cause IV: The banking system problems 
In the Crisis, the banking system also played an important role. In Hamann 
(1999) states that "the Asian crisis differed from previous financial crises that created a 
need for the IMF's assistance. It was rooted primarily in financial system vulnerabilities 
and other structural weakness" (p.9). Since most of the financial markets in Asian region 
were relatively underdeveloped, so most of the capital inflows and outflows occurred on 
local banks. Within the sample period (1987 - 1996), we used the data of deposit money 
bank because this is the one available throughout whole period. In Table 2.2 and Table 
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oresenleo the deposit money bank 
as per'ceIltal:!;e of GDP respectively. In 
sector as per'ceIlta,:;e growth and 
1"" .. 1"""". .... , from 11 
1987 to 1 percent 1996, u,",,,,au.:,,, eCOinOlTIlC situations in Japan 
In China, the growth rate, in exception with 43 increased 
19 percent in 1987 to 24 percent in 1996 it fluctuated 
10 percent and 20 percent and with 15 percent 1 
During the last decade, we observed that most of money banks in 
to nn:anc:e .. ""cr, ..... " were over-lending to different local sectors in 
Among different Asia countries, most of them norm over-lending 
to sectors from the banks. 
quantity of loans, the quality of by 
were low, with uncertain profitability return or with "'1J"''' ..... 1U. .. 
UUCU,,/lal assets. In most of the 
exposed to the Crisis, the 
and poor profitability industry. The 
borrowed from foreign banks then lent to the aOlne!;tIC 
u.:>"'V""J'CJ.L~"" with financial difficulties, the domestic 
loans and foreign liabilities. 
opinion, it stated, 
a weak bank and nonblank sector complicated 
weak banking system becomes an indicator of 
to attack currency." (Ito, Capital Flows in 
addition, 
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p. 1 
non-
and 
was over 
the 
When the 
domestic 
"There is indeed ovelWhelming that the Asian banking and 
financial were very fragile - poorly supervised, poorly regulated, 
and in a even before the onset of crisis." (Corsetti, 
and Roubini, What Caused the Asian Currency and Financial 
p.28) 
Table 
Deposit Money Bank Lending to Private Sector, 1987 -1996 
(% growth) 
1987 1990 1991 
Japan 11.17 9.2'1 5.29 
China 19.5 22.90 19.76 
Hong Kong NA NA NA 10.17 
Singapore 6.41 12.41 9.77 
Korea 13.93 .82 20.78 12.55 12.94 
Taiwan NA 21.25 28.70 19.46 
Indonesia 29.00 66.33 17.82 12 25.48 
Malaysia 0.06 21.16 20.58 10.80 
Philippines 20.60 29.20 7.30 40.74 
Thailand 22.59 31.32 34.76 20.45 20.52 24.03 
NA: Not available 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1999. 
In exception, Taiwan, from Asian Development Bank. 
Table 2.3 
Deposit Money Bank lending to Private Sector, 1987 -1996 
(% ofGDP) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1996 
1.17 
15.45 20.01 
16.18 10.00 6.00 
22.97 22.57 22.68 
16.04 30.65 25.77 
26.52 45.40 48.72 
30.26 23.76 14.63 
1994 1995 
,Japan 110.85 115.02 120.04 121.94 120.47 119.94 117.52 116.81 117.79 
China 78.70 74.30 78.38 86.58 89.27 88.75 95.49 87.12 85.83 
Hong Kong NA NA NA NA 141.84 134.20 140.02 149.00 155.24 
I",:. 84.22 78.98 82.16 82.20 83.34 85.06 84.14 84.21 90.75 I vii I!:jClfJVI \;; 
Korea 46.75 52.81 53.34 54.21 56.84 57.04 
1996 
115.21 
91.65 
162.36 
95.96 
61.81 44.33~ 52.54 
Taiwan NA NA NA 100.41 108.99 126.43 13~~14605 Indonesia 21.79 25.98 32.521 .q.ru 7 45.79 45.51 48.9 53.48 ~
Malaysia 64.44 61.37 66.59 71.44 75.29 74.72 74.06 . 84.80 . 
Philippines 15.98 16.12 ~~ 17.76 20.44 26.37 29.06 37.52 48.43 Thailand 47.30 51.04 67.70 72.24 80.01 91.00 97.62 101.94 
NA: Not '-" "' . ,I,  ",~.~ 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1999. 
In exception, Taiwan, from Asian Bank. 
Cause V: Roles of foreign portfolio investors 
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One of the success factors for Asian region is the massive capital inflow, either 
increase input for production as mentioned above. However, this is also one of the 
causes for the Crisis. During the 1990s, the capital inflow in Asian region, most of them 
were short-tenn loans, increased from an average of 1.4 percent of GDP between 1986 
and 1990 to 6.7 percent between 1990 and 1996. The reasons of this large capital inflow 
were that the capital market liberalization in the industrialized countries facilitated a 
greater flow of funds to emerging markets around the globe. In addition, low rate of 
return in the United States and Japan favored outward investment to these Asian 
countries, which have the factors of continuing economic growth, wide-ranging financial 
deregulation in the local banks and domestic corporations, without sufficient supervision, 
with low currency risk because of pegging exchange rate, and Asian country 
governments encouraged foreign investments with special incentives. In the period of 
Crisis, the net private inflows of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and 
South Korea in total with a net inflows dropped from $93 billion to -$12.1 billion, with 
an opposition position of $105 billion outflow of capital or 11 percent of GDP growth 
within a short period of time. This was hardly for a country to adjust their system within 
that short period with that large amount of capital outflows. Consequences, the nominal 
and real exchange rate depreciated, interest rate increased sharply and rapid rose in non-
performing loans in banking sectors. All of these contributed to the bad economic 
conditions for different Asian countries. As Ito said, 
''Third, short-term liabilities were mounting in some of Asian countries, 
most notably in Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea. These short-tenn capital 
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can withdrawn quickly and put pressure on the exchange rate." (Ito, 
Capital Flows in Asia, p. 18) 
Cause VI: The political instability and financial policy uncertainty 
During the 1997 and 1998, the political and financial policies were instable and 
uncertain in different Asia countries. In Thailand, the government broke its promise to 
buy in bad property debts, failed to save Finance One, cabinet reshuffled and eventually 
government collapsed. In Malaysia, the Prime Minister Mahathir announced against 
"rogue speculators" and international "morons". In Indonesia, the elections, the bad 
news about the health of the Indonesian president Suharto, his policy reversal for the 
International Monetary Fund bailout programs, and finally resigned from the president 
office. In South Korea, the presidential campaign and the elected president Kim Dae 
lung with contradictory signals, the threat of labor unrest in the region and the bankrupt 
of chaebols. Throughout the Crisis, market reacted to the political and policy uncertainty 
in the region. In addition, different governments did not seriously implement the 
International Monetary Fund supported programs at the beginning. All of these 
. . . 
uncertainties make the economic conditions worse and more serious and also frightened 
the domestic and foreign investors. 
"A deterioration in expectations about the political and financial 
environment can contribute to a balance of payments and exchange rate 
crisis, especially when economic fundamentals are not very comforting. 
Such shifts in expectations can occur quickly and without warning." 
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(Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, What Caused the Asian Currency and 
Financial Crisis?, p23) 
Cause VII: The contagion effect of the Crisis 
The starting point of the Asian Financial Crisis began in Thailand on July 2, 1997. 
At first, it was a local crisis. Finally, it affected nearly all of the Asian countries. Why 
the local crisis will become a worldwide crisis? The reason is the contagion effect on the 
investors. When the Thai crisis started, it scared the investors to pull out their money 
from the Thai markets. In addition, because most of the Asian countries had the similar 
economic structures as Thai did. Therefore, they unquestionable pull out their money 
from the neighbor countries, which the economic situation in these countries did not have 
problems. Finally, this formed the crisis to be contagious. The good example to show 
the crisis is in the form of contagion through South Korea. In South Korea, before the 
Crisis, it was the 11 th largest economy and became as a new member of DECD. Because 
of the contagion effect, the lenders of the South Korea refused to roll over the interest 
rate that caused the Crisis spread from the Southeast Asia to South Korea. In fact, the 
proximity of South Korea and other countries are far away. Therefore, the spread was 
because of the misconception of the lenders. This caused of the bank run of a country 
and finally developed into the Asian Financial Crisis. 
In Park and Song (1999), 
"This lead to the conclusion that financial panic and herd behavior were 
important causes of spreading the Thai crisis to NIE 4. The fmancial 
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markets of NIE 4 suffered initially the fallout of the crisis in ASEAN-4." 
(Park, and Song, Financial Contagion in the East Asian Crisis, p.20) 
Summary 
In summary, it already discussed about the seven major causes that enhance the 
local Thai crisis into the Asian Financial Crisis. Most of them related to each other. 
Among these seven causes, the fundamental causes will be the Cause II and Cause IV. 
This also provides the reason for the length of the Crisis is lasting so long. This is 
because most of the causes are already existed for a long time. They accumulated high 
pressure to the occurrence of the Crisis. During the Crisis, the International Monetary 
Fund granted Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea of bailout programs, which 
mentioned the announcement date in Section A. What are the bailout programs about? 
Do these programs help the countries to stabilize their economy? Chapter 3 will provide 
the answer. 
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Chapter 3 
Critical of IMF Programs 
it already U'''''"''''';)'"''"''-' causes of the Asian Financial 
International Monetary Fund the Crisis. During the 
Monetary Fund had three bailout Implemented in Thailand, 
South with the amount of 1 billion US dollar, 58.4 billion US 
dollar, and billion US dollar respectively. The total amount for all three programs 
was 117.9 dollar provided by lnt(~rn:atloinal Monetary Fund, World Bank, 
Asian Bank (ADB), and Bilateral. of 
communities to programs illustrated 
Table 3.1 
Communities 
World Bank, 
IMF ADB Bilateral Total 
Thailand 4.0 2.7 10.5 17.2 
South Korea 21.1 14.2 23.1 58.4 
Indonesia 11.2 10.0 21.1 42.3 
Total 36.3 26.9 54.7 117.9 
All in billion US dollars 
Source: International Fund 
announcements of throughout 
the programs had of want to accomplish, 
which were: 
Immediate goal: 
• Restoring '"'v ........... "'. and creditworthiness in the 
• Prevent debts default; 
• .. ""'llU5 of monetary policy to limit "A ... HUJ"5'" rate depredation; 
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• Control the inflation rate; 
• Strengthen and structural refonn of financial systems, especially banking sector; 
• Remove monopolies, trade barriers, and nontransparent corporate practices; 
• Rebuild foreign exchange reserves; 
• Maintain a balance fiscal policy; 
• Limit the decline of output and increase the efficiency; 
Intermediate goal: 
• Shortening and easing the adjustment period in the program countries through 
reducing of the social costs of adjustment and easing of the effect of credit 
tightness and reductions in trade financing; 
Long-term goal: 
• To enable the affected Asian countries to emerge more strongly in development 
• Strengthen the international monetary system to meet the next century challenges. 
In order to achieve these goals, the International Monetary Fund initial bailout 
programs include different features that the countries required to strictly follow. 
In the following sections, I will mention the details of different bailout programs, 
associate with several modifications after the first implementation in Thailand, South 
Korea, as well as Indonesia. All the details in different bailout programs developed from 
different sources included Wall Street Journal (1997 - 98, selected issues), the official 
announcements from the International Monetary Fund, the recipient countries and other 
related economic research papers. In addition, I will concentrate the critical analysis on 
the initial program implement on each country in order to have conclusion on the 
feasibility of these initial programs. 
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Section A 
Thailand Program 
The Asian 
speculative attacks and 
in Thailand on July 2, 1997 under a series 
confidence in the economy. On 20, 
1997, International Monetary Fund approved a stand-by credit Thailand of to 
SDR 2.9 billion of about 4 billion US dollar. stand-by credit equivalent to 
percent of Thailand's quota will distribute over the next 
the total amOlmt in the bailouts program was 17.2 billion 
economic reform associated with information 
period. In addition, 
dollar with a of 
I used to form my detail 
information for the Thailand program is based on the Letter of Intent of the government 
"<",''''''1' .... and Wall Street Journal (Aug, 1997 issues). 
Exhibit 3.1 summarized the detail of the initial program of economic reform 
proposed by the International the Thailand government to follow. 
The initial program included the details on the financial sector policy, 
new framework for monetary policy. and structural reform In order to increase the 
efficiency transparency of the economy. 
nu!'p''''~r the initial did not have the expected outcome on the 
Baht was depreciation. sharpen than the expectation in slowdown 
economy and severe adverse regional economic developments. Therefore, the initial 
program followed with five modifications from November 1 to December 1998. All 
the details ofthe five modifications in Exhibit 
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The modification announced through the Letter of Intent on November 
1997 to adjustment according current unfavorable outcome 
implemented. 
On February 24, 1 the Second modification on the program was proposed. It 
decided to the stabilizing the rate, limit the degree negative 
impact on the economic, set the stage to return to international financial 
The Third modification proposed on May 1998, main purpose was to 
minimize further of the and early rpc·cnJ, ... r" with 
rate and confidence. 
Fourth modification made on August 25, 1998. Having an updated 
macroeconomic framework 
incorporated a more 
the economic development through the first half 
approach to and (',.,. .. "",.,..·",tp restructuring. 
Final modification implemented on December 1, 1998 in to further 
"","<1«",,,, a recovery of the real economy by a fiscal stimulus to u...,.u .... " 
supportive monetary stance, and further corporate debt ... .,CI't,..,"'T1 
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Exhibit 3.1 
The IMF initial Thailand bailout program 
Announcement Date: August 11, 1997 
Initial Date: August 20, 1997 
Stand-by-Credit: US$4 billion or 505 n""'''''''''It of its 
Total Amount: US$17.2 billion 
Last: over 34-month period 
No of Modifications: 5 
Modified Date: 1997 -- November 25 
1998 -- February 24, May August 25, December 1 
14'l't':.flVI'!!I." To achieve an orderly adjustment of the domestic economy to the reduction in the 
current account deficit to about 5% of GDP in 1997 and 3% in 1998; maintaining gross 
official reserves at the of 4.2 months of imports in 1997 and 4.4 in 1998; limit 
inflation rate to 9.5% in 1997 and 5% in 1 a credible and 
financial sector 
Initial program of economic reform: 
- Monetary policy and exchange rate 
- a new framework in strict control over the aggregates with the unconditional 
support to the insolvent institutions, with the new managed float for the Baht 
- the program make an expansion of 7% in broad money during and reserve money 
growth of 8% in order to reduce money demand in the near term 
a rise in interest rates to guard the unexpected shift in flows 
Fiscal 
- fiscal measures equivalent to about 3 of GDP to correct the sector deficit to a 
of 1 percent of GDP in 1997/98 from a deficit in 1.6% of GDP in 1996/97 
the necessary improvement in the current account position 
costs of financial restructuring, an increase in the VAT tax rate from 7% to 10% 
- to limit the effects of the cuts on economic growth and income distribution 
- introduce additional expenditure and revenue measures with selective tax rates and 
1'"(,,,,,"I,,,nm(1 the tax base 
- Financial sector restructuring 
- identification and closure of unviable financial institutions (including 56 finance companies out of 91) 
- intervention in the weakest banks 
·ec(~pi'tali:zation of the financial institutions to the legally required level or 
to restore public confidence in the financial system as quick as 
institutions that cannot raise their to the 
over by the FIDF 
- Other structural measures 
take over 
through the fund 
level will be taken 
structural initiatives to increase ",n,rl<'n,.'\1 deepen the role of the sector and reinforce its 
outward orientation include civil services privatization, and attract capital 
control on Baht borrowing by with the proper time to restore the foreign 
market 
Sources: Leller of intent of the government of Thailand, Wall Street Journal 
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Exhibit 3.2 
The modifications of the Thailand bailout program 
First Modification of the program (Nov 25,1997): 
- Additional measures to maintain the public sector surplus at 1 % of GOP 
- Establishment a specific timetable for implementing financial sector restructuring in strategies of 
recapitalization and strengthening of the financial system 
- Acceleration of plans to protect the weaker sectors of society 
Second Modification of the program (Feb 24, 1998): 
- Accelerating financial system restructuring, emphasis on the privatization of the intervened banks 
- Adjusting fiscal policy targets from public sector surplus of about 1 % GOP to a deficit of 2% of GDP 
- Ensuring an adequate availability of credit to the economy to foster economic recovery 
- Tight monetary policy in order to have exchange rate stability 
- Deepening the role of private sector in order to attract foreign capital 
- Strengthening the social safety net 
Third Modification of the program (May 26, 1998): 
- Further reductions in interest rates, higher monetary growth rates with the recovering money demand 
- Adjusting the fiscal target by increasing the public sector deficit target to 3% of GOP 
- Additional 0.5% of budget GOP to strengthen the social safety net 
- Accelerating corporate debt restructuring by strengthening legal and institutional framework 
- include reform of the bankruptcy act, foreclosure procedures, and foreign investment restrictions 
- Continuing focus on the financial sector reform, especially in the banking system 
- Strengthen the finance company sector 
- Resolving the status of the 4 intervened banks to minimize the need for future public support 
Fourth Modification of the program (Aug 25,1998): 
- Maintain 3% of GOP target for the public sector deficit in 1997/98, and target 3% deficit in 1998/99 
- Accelerate bank and corporate restructuring through new initiatives include plans to resolve the 
status of intervened banks and weak finance companies and provision of public funds for recapitalizing 
while linking to progress in corporate debt 
- Tax law change and establishment of a Corporate Restructuring AdviSOry Committee 
- Strengthen the social safety net 
- Further opening economy to foreign investment through privatization and conversion of the Alien 
Business Law into a more liberal foreign investment law 
Final Modification of the program (Dec 1,1998): 
- Raise the target public sector deficit from 3% to 5% of GOP in 1998/99 
- Steadfast implementation of the August 14 package on financial sector restructuring and related 
structural and legal form 
- Voluntary, market-based strategy for corporate debt restructuring by developing an effective 
monitoring system, credit bureaus, and reviewing options for future adjustments. 
Sources: Leiter of Intent of the government of Thailand, Wall Street Journal 
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Section B 
Indonesia Program 
After the crash of financial market Thailand, the effect exposed the financial 
economy structural weakness in Indonesia's economy, which included the 
amount of short-term foreign owned by the private corporate sector. On November 
5, 1997, the International Monetary Fund approved a stand-by for Indonesia of up 
to SDR billion of about 10 billion US dollar. This stand-by credit, which is 
equivalent to percent of quota, will distribute over the next 36-month 
In addition, the total amount in the bailouts program was 42.3 billion dollar 
with a of economic reform items with it. 
Exbibit 3.3 summarized the detail of the initial program of economic reform 
proposed by the International Monetary Fund for Indonesia government to follow. 
The initial """"nT'"",",,, included details on the .uu ......... UJ. sector 
reforms to enhance economic efficiency and transparency, stabilizing the Rupiah through 
monetary and exchange rate policy, and policy. 
After announcement the International Monetary bailout program, the 
Indonesian "''''"''U,",'.H continuing loss confident and with declining the 
Rupiah. The Indonesian authorities announced reinforcement and acceleration of the 
program in the Memorandum Economic and In,,,,,,,,,'u Policies on January 15, 1 
details listed 3.4. 
On April 10, 1 the Indonesian government issued a Supplementary 
Memorandum Economic la.ll'~U;U Policies to previous policy uncertain, 
the Rupiah to stabilize, increased sharply, economic condition 
57 
deteriorated. This modification included the macroeconomic policies to the deteriorated 
economic situation and enhanced the structural and banking reforms. 
The economic situation was worsened, the social disturbances and the political 
shift in May. The program prioritized to strengthen the social safety net, restructure the 
banking system, and repair the weakened distribution system. This modification made on 
June 24, 1998. On July 29, 1998, the government requested the cancellation of the 
current stand-by arrangement and replaced with a new extended arrangement. In 
addition, government strengthened the strategy for bank and corporate restructuring and 
improved the distribution system. All the details listed in Exhibit 3.4. 
There had three more modifications in Indonesia announced on September 11, 
1998, October 19, 1998, and November 13, 1998 respectively. These three modifications 
updated the programs in the current economic situations. The details of these three 
modifications were not listed in Exhibit 3 because of lack of information. 
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Exhibit 3.3 
Tbe IMF initial Indonesia bailout program 
Announcement date: October 31, 1997 
Initial Date: November 5, 1997 
Stand-by-Credit: US$10 billion or 490 percent of its quota 
Total Amount: US$42.3 billion 
Last: over 36-month period 
No of Modifications: 7 
Modified Date: 1998 -- January 15, April 10, June 24, July 29, (details available) 
September 11, October 19, November 13 (details not available) 
Objectives: To stabilize the rupiah while maintaining gross foreign exchange reserves at a comfortable 
level; limiting the economic downturn during the remainder of this year and next year; 
control the inflation rate no more than 10% in 1998/99 and lower it to 5%; reduce the 
current account deficit to below 3% of GOP with steady decline in the external debt 
Initial program of economic reform: 
- Monetary policy and exchange rate policy 
- the retention of a tight monetary policy to maintain stability in the fiancial market 
- foreign exchange intervention to restore confidence and proveide a clear direction to the market 
- flexible exchange rate and aimed to keep the inflation rate below 10% 
- Bank of Indonesia will limit the base money ceiling as a prelude to phase out the program 
- Fiscal policy 
- fiscal measures about 1 % of GOP in 1997/98 and 2% in 1998/99 
- yield a public sector surplus of 1 % of GOP in both periods 
- facilitate external adjustment and provide resources to pay for financial restructuring through the 
reform of tax policy and tax base 
- fiscal measures include cutting low priority expenditures (reschedule or postpone the infrastructure 
projects), removing government subsidies, eliminating VAT exemptions, adjusting administered 
prices 
- government intend to move to a comprehensive and transparent system to report on the public 
sector fiscal sector 
- Financial sector restructuring 
- close unviable institutions 
- merging state bank or require them to formulate and implement rehabilitation plans within 60 days 
- establishing a timetable for dealing with remaining weak institutions 
- improving the institutional, legal, and regulatory framework for the financial system 
- government will not guarantee repayment of the liabilities of these banks except for small depositors 
with amout up to Rp 20 million per depositor per bank. 
- Bank of Indonesia will closely surprvise the implementation of the rehabilitaion plans 
- introduce private sector ownership of at least 20% in at least one state bank within one year 
- the regional banks with major losses will place under conservatorship and the FX license suspend 
- Structural reforms enhance economic efficiency and transparency by 
- liberalization of foreign trade and investment 
- dismantling of domestic monopolies 
- expanding the privatization program 
- implement and expand the social safey net program 
- regular publicate the fianncial data and strengthen the monitoring procedure 
Sources: Letter of Intent of the government of IndoneSia, Wall Street Journal 
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Exhibit 3.4 
Tbe modifications of tbe Indonesia bailout program 
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (Jan 15,1998): 
• Adjust 1998/99 budget that the sector deficit of about 1 % of GDP to accommodate part of the 
economic slowdown 
· Cancel 12 infrastructure nrn",,,,,,,,,,, of IPTN's ",i",I",r,,,, and the National Car project 
· Further bank and corporate sector restructuring, establishment of the Indonesia Bank Restructuring 
(lBRA) and on bank and credits 
Umit the monopoly of the national marketing board (BULOG) to rice, 
agricultural and eliminating restrictive market arrangements 
domestic trade in 
· To relieve the suffering caused by the drought ensuring clut"UUCll<" food supplies available at 
reasonable price 
Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (April 10, 1998): 
Strong monetary policy to stabilize the 
Accelerated bank restructuring with IBRA to continue of take-over/closure of weak institutions 
- Issue bonds to finance the restoration of financial qualified institutions 
il'Y'li,,,<>tinn of existing ownership restrictions on banks and a new bankruptcy law 
of structural reforms to enhance competition and Affi,r"iAIr'lr"V of economy, 
nn"",ti",,,,jinn of 6 major state and of 7 new for privatization in 
- Accelerated to develop a framework with foreign creditors to restore trade financing and to resolve the 
issue of the corporate debt and interbank credit 
- Strengthening the social safety net through small and medium-sized company and public works 
t-nr1::lrllrm,1l the program through monitoring by the Indonesia Executive Committee of the 
Resilience Council in cooperation with IMF. the World Bank, and the ADB 
Second Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (June 24, 1998): 
- Increase social expenditure to 7.5% of GDP and limit the budget deficit to 8.5% of GD? 
Rehabilitating and strengthening the distribution system caused by social disturbances 
• Restructuring the banking system through recapitalize, merge, or effectively close weak banks, with 
the commitment to guarantee all and creditors 
- Establish as effective bankruptcy system and Strengthening the rnnnilt1nn,1l of the economic program 
Letter of Intent (July 29, 1998): 
- In progress in restructuring the banking by !>Il""''''''''' for sale of one of the six audited banks, 
- Transfer seven banks asset to asset management unit. transfer six state banks from the Ministry of 
State Enterprises to the Ministry of Finance 
- Officially launch the Indonesia Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA), removing restrictions on debt-
conversions and tax neutrality for mergers, and dealing with direct investments 
- Improving the distribution system and the social safety net to low income family 
Sources: Letter of the government of Indonesia, Wall Street Journal 
60 
Section C 
South Korea Program 
After the crash of financial market in Thailand, the effect spread to the South 
Korea, which has advanced industrial economy. The financial and economy structural 
weakness in South Korea's economy was due to the government interference and the 
close relationship between banks and conglomerates. The Asian Financial Crisis led the 
investors of lack of market confidence brought the country close to depleting its foreign 
exchange reserves. On December 4, 1997, the International Monetary Fund approved a 
stand-by credit for Indonesia of up to SDR 15.5 billion of about 21 billion US dollar. 
This stand-by credit, which is equivalent to 1,939 percent of Indonesia's quota, will 
distribute over the next 36-month period. In addition, the total amount in the bailouts 
program is 58.4 billion US dollar with a series of economic refonn items associated with 
it. 
Exhibit 3.5 summarized the detail of the initial program of economic refonn 
proposed by the International Monetary Fund for the South Korea government to follow. 
The initial program included the details on the monetary policy and exchange rate policy, 
fiscal policy, financial sector restructuring, efforts on enhancing economic efficiency and 
transparency, trade liberalization measures, capital account liberalization the regular 
publication and dissemination of key economic and financial data. 
After implemented the initial bailout program in South Korea, the situation did 
not response as the expectation. The financial crisis in South Korea worsened and 
concerned about whether the international banks would roll over the short-tenn external 
debt. So, the revised version of the initial was announced on December 24, 1997. The 
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details of the entire revised version of bailout programs presented in Exhibit 3.6. In 
addition, the other revision details listed in Exhibit 3.6. This version aimed for the 
roll overs and extension claims by international creditors. 
On January 7, 1998 and February 7, 1998, the program was further revised in the 
macroeconomic framework with a lower growth of 1 percent for 1998. In addition, the 
set up of the Tripartite Accord between labor, business, and government concern about 
the social issue. 
On May 2, 1998, July 24, 1998 and November 13, 1998, all the revisions were 
response to adjust the program to fit into the current situations during the ending period 
of the Crisis. 
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Exhibit 3.5 
The IMF initial bailout program of South Korea 
Announcement Date: Decemner 4. 1997 
Initial Date: December 4, 1997 
Stand·by·Credit: US$21 billion or 1,939 percent of its quota 
Total Amount: US$58.4 billion 
Last: over 36-month period 
No of Modifications: 6 
Modified Date: 1997 -- December 24 
1998 -- 7, February 7, 2, July 24, November 13 
IOtlle(:tlv,es: To narrow the external current account deficit to below 1% of GDP in 98 and 99; inflation 
at or below 5%; return of confidence that limit the deceletarion in real GOP growth 
to about 3% in 1998 
Initial program of economic refonn: 
- Monetary policy and exchange rate policy 
- tighten monetary policy to restore and sustain calm in the markets and have impact on 
Won on inflation 
- interest rate raised from 12.5% on December 1 to 21 % on December 5 and will raise further 
money growth will limited to a rate of 5% or less which equivalent to inflation rate 
- flexible exchange rate will be maintained 
will keep in 1998 in order to reduce the burden on monetary policy and the costs 
the financial sector 
- fiscal measures (include the bases of rr.rnr.r"t<> income, and VAT 
2% of GDP to have room for financial sector in the budget 
- Financial sector restructuring 
- introduce a clear and firm exit policy for financial institutions, market and 
and independence for central bank by revised Bank of Korea Act 
Ic:t"":)nrl<>r! the operations of 14 insolvent merchant banks 
govemment capital injections to two large distressed commercial banks 
equal to about 
- all commercial banks with capital were to submit plans for recapitalization 
upgrade accounting, and disclosure standards, which corporate financial statements 
prepared in consolidated basis and certified by external auditors. 
- disposal of loans will be accelerated 
- Other structural measures 
- Trade liberalization measures 
a timetable in line with WTO commitments to eliminate trade-related subsidies and the 
import diversification program in order to the import certification IJI .. ,,,,,,UUI 
- Capital account liberalization 
- to open up its money, bond, and equity markets to capital inflows and to foreign direct investment 
- Corporate governance and corporate structure 
- timetable will set by the time of review, no govemment or tax privileges, reduce debt-equity 
ratio of corporations, and markets, and the will reduce the risks involved 
- Labor market reform to facilitate the redeployment of labor 
Information Provision provide regular publication and dissemination of financial data 
Sources:IMF arrangmenet, Wall Street Journal 
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Exhibit 3.6 
The modifications of the South Korea bailout program 
First Modification ofthe program (Dec 24, 1997): 
- Further money tightening and the abolition of the daily rate band 
Speed up the liberalization of and money markets as of all account restrictions 
on investors' access to the Korean bond market by December 31,1997 
- Accelerating the implementation of the comprehensive restructuring plan for the financial sector and 
the trade liberalization under binding with WTO in financial with the OECD 
Second Modification of the program (Jan 1, 1998); 
- Provide additional details on externallinancing and reserve management strategies outlined previous 
Third Modification of the program (Feb 7,1998): 
- Targeting a fiscal deficit of 1 % of GDP for 1998 to accommodate the of weaker economic and 
allow higher on the social safety net 
- To implement a broader strategy of financial sector restructuring contained the immediate dangers of 
disruptions to the financial system 
- Increase the range and amounts of financial instruments available to investors 
with strengthen the functions of corporate boards of 
to shareholders and external audit committees 
Fourth Modification of the program (May 2,1998); 
- Accommodation of a fiscal deficit of about 2% of GDP in 1998 
- Strengthen and social net: widen the coverage of unemployment and minimum benefits 
- Form an appraisal committee with international experts to evaluate the recapiitaliizaltion 
- Regulations to bring Korea's prudential regulations doser to international best ",,,,, .. Ii,-.,,,, 
- Further liberalize the account in foreign exchange transactions, foreign nwnp.lr!':hin of assets 
Fifth Modification of the program (July 24, 1998): 
- Accommodation of a larger fiscal deficit of about 5% of GDP in 1998 
- To bolster the social ",,,,_n,tiih program through extense the coverage of In,,,mnlnvlmt>lnl benefits 
- Framework for corporate negotiated with the World Bank to facilitate debt workouts and 
minimize to use the "rescue" loans 
- Further financial sector with the implementation plans of the remaining 7 banks 
- Further improving capital market development through legislation which allow mutual funds, securities 
Final Modification of the program (Nov 13, 1998) 
- Concentrate on publiC investment spending in the lirst half of 1999 and improve the timeliness 
- Further strengthening of the social net through expansion programs 
- doubling the budgetary allocation of public works programs 
- temporary livelihood program and widening of the unemployment insurance 
- Move forward to the nrh/~ti,.~t·i{\n program 
- Support domestic demand indude trade for small and medium sized 
Sources:IMF Stand-by a"angrnenet, Wall Street Journal 
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Section D 
Critical of the Bailout Programs 
Among the bailout programs in Thailand, Indonesia, and South 
programs with common features in order to 
long-term goals mentioned in the above. 
as very heart of the 
account 
• Large amount bank closure in order to limit 
• 
• 
• 
show that 
confidence 
The 
system to 
Tightening 
availability in 
All of the 
were serious about 
a rapid 
foundation as quick as 
credit through raised 
to defend the exchange rate 
debt obligations were repaid 
programs provided by International Monetary 
international "Vj'll ..... "ll"" 
immediate, intermediate, 
common features were: 
to surplus in the current 
loses being accumulated and 
reform in order to 
to return the 
rate and reduced monetary 
the credit from the bailout 
hopefully will restore 
• Each the non-financial structure change such as 
reducing L<UIJ.J.i:>, ODt~mrLg sectors for foreign and reducing monopoly 
powers. 
Generally, 
above. In contrast, 
country 
parts designed for each I"nl''''t.''u are similar as stated in the 
programs also have the that designed specific for 
TTPrPTll'P were: 
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• The heavy weight on the social safety net in Indonesia rather than others because 
of the political disturbance during 1998 
• In Korea, program emphasize on the negotiation among the foreign investment 
banks to roll over the short tenn debt interest rate 
In the following part, I will do the critical analysis of the initial bailout programs. 
After the implementation of different programs, the respond from the markets were 
unexpected. In some sense, the initial version of the bailout programs was mis-targeting 
the causes of the Crisis. The policies required the governments to follow were too tough 
to accomplish during the Crisis period. Since these three bailout programs were similar 
and have a lot of common problems, I will point out the problems that are common in 
each program. 
Financial Institutions closure or merge 
In Thailand initial program, the International Monetary Fund proposed the closure 
of 56 unviable financial institutions immediate with the 91 financial institutions in total. 
Doubtless, these 56 unviable financial institutions needed to be merger or liquidated. In 
Indonesia, the International Monetary Fund proposed to close 16 banks that were legally 
insolvency. In Korea, the program focused on restructuring merchant banks that 14 of 
them were forced to close. 
The open issue of this action of bank closure is that the method of closure and the 
time frame for the method. The International Monetary Fund proposed to close these 56 
Thailand financial institutions and 16 Indonesia banks immediate, however, without a 
66 
more comprehensive program to .. "'."" ........ financial sector. This will only the 
severe situation in and Indonesia. Korea, the of merchant 
brings out 
immediate closure 
of bank ratios. addition, the 
also bring up bank run with all other fmancial institutions 
and will more difficult to operate normal lending. 
The Recapitalization of Financial Institutions 
the financial institutions were not the situation immediate 
many of required to TP"" ..... ·r" because of amount of non-performing 
loans. The International Monetary tried to enforce to early of 
capital during the Crisis. instance, program of llHJlVl1'.,.":>1.",, required 
financial to raise level to 9% by end 1997, and 12% by end of 
2001. In Thailand, financial need to legal capital or being taken over by 
the The situation Korea was Hpy·pnf which the 
needed to have rehabilitation plan to do the recapitalize, because initial program 
~_, .. ,..,..._~ as a longer 
raise the 
to do the recapitalization. 
ue!mCln about the for recapitalization. This seems 
difficult for HUUU,.,uu institutions to recapitalize capital the Crisis, with the severe 
situation. obviously, the credit of Thailand 
Indonesia. addition, .nt··r .. "", .. the amount non-performing loans because banks 
forced to reclaim debt early. 
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Monetary and Excbange Rate Policy 
For the monetary policy, in Thailand, the new framework to control the 
aggregates monetary in the system associated with a new managed float for the Baht. In 
all three programs, the International Monetary Fund proposed to have a high interest rate 
and tight monetary supply to against the depreciation. It supposed the foreign investor 
would not flee out from the local market because of the attraction of high interest. 
However, the high interest will lead to a serious problem before the exchange rate was 
stabilized. The corporate, borrowed from banks, will not able to pay the high interest rate 
on their loan for a long period of time. This will finally forced certain amount of the 
corporate loans to become non-performing loans. 
Fiscal Policy 
The fiscal policy, which was the key to the credibility of the overall program, 
requests the Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea with surplus of 1 % of GDP in 
1997/98. However, the fiscal policy was impossible to achieve during the Crisis time. 
Therefore, this seems the toughest provisions for the government to follow it. 
From the above four analysis on bank closure, recapitalization, monetary policy, 
and fiscal policy showed that the initial bailout program was not provide a suitable 
solution to the crisis in Thailand. In some sense, this program deepened the severe 
situation in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea. Therefore, the International Monetary 
Fund provided different modification programs to the initial bailout program to make the 
initial program to be appropriate and realistic. A brief details of the modification 
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programs of Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea 
respectively. 
3.2, and 3.6 
this Chapter, it covered goals, common features and differences among 
initial bailout programs Thailand, ~A"'VU"' .. H'" and It also the 
programs modification as supplement to 
programs of Thailand, Indonesia, and South 
program was proposed. 
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initial Overall, the initial 
did not perform the expectations when 
Chapter 4 
Empirical Analysis 
The currency depreciated, stock markets plummeted, and inflation rate high. 
In the previous chapter, I already dissected the three International Monetary Fund 
bailout programs that applied on Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea during the Asian 
Financial Crisis. According to the details in the initial bailout programs, theoretically, 
they had four main problems that mistreat as the solutions of the Crisis. These problems 
worsened, instead of release, the severe situations in these countries. This raised the 
question on the purpose of each bailout programs, which the International Monetary Fund 
proposes to stabilize the economic. 
In this chapter, I will conduct two statistical tests, which are event-study test and 
variance- ratio test, by using the data during the Crisis to investigate the real impact of 
the International Monetary Fund bailout programs on the granted countries. The event-
study test is trying to investigate the abnormal return on different markets of the granted 
countries on the specific announcement day. The variance-ratio test is trying to 
determine the volatility of different market on the announcement day. This statistical 
analysis approach will show the actual market reactions in responding to these initial 
bailout programs on each of these countries. 
The following section states the research objectives and hypotheses of the event-
study model and variance-ratio model. Section B will be the mechanism on the 
methodology for these two models. Section C will be analysis of my result. Finally, 
Section D will be conclusions and limitations of my results. 
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Section A 
Research Objective 
My objective IS to answer: "Did IMF Programs 
Stabilize the Markets of Southeast Asia during Asian Financial 
this question, we select countries' data Datastream. 
before days after the announcement 
International Monetary Fund. using each 1'I'\1,nh''U 
two models respectively. These factors (1) stock 
To vA<UU"Uv 
sample range is 
by the 
applying to 
exchange, (2) 
and (3) 
each country. 
rate. They can reflect the va~'aVUH of the bailout programs to 
Event-Study Test: 
In event-study the main ..... " ... ""1'''''''' is to determine abnormal return on 
of the markets with the bailout program announcement We e"., ..... "",.,. that 
the program announcement will certain degree influence on (lltterent countries' 
markets. The equation I am going to data will be as follow: 
R it = a i + ~ asiai asia, mt + ~ world,i world,mt + & i D i,t + E i,t 
Where 
i = country 
Dil 1 event window 
o if non event window 
Therefore, we use hypothesis ''''''LU", to check each reaction. 
hypothesis of the test two parts: 
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p = 0 or 0 = 0 (null hypothesis) 
: P <> 0 or 0 <> 0 (alternative hypothesis): 
function of null hypothesis is as a control of the model, which means that the market 
do not have ",h1''''w,,,,, return. hypothesis is we concern, which 
shows the abnormal return, 
announcement of the bailout 
positive or negative, on the markets aSSOCllate:d with the 
We use 95% as our a-level to check for 
significance means that the result is significant if p-value is less than 0.05. the p-value 
is greater than 0.05, we conclude otherwise 
Variance-ratio Test: 
In the variance-ratio model, its purpose is to compare the volatility of different 
markets before and the bailout programs announcement. the programs work 
stabling the markets effectively, the volatility the after the announcement 
will The presented in following: 
Result ( ri After) / (a2Before) ~ F n·l, m-l 
Where: 
F is the result of the above equation 
Fc is the point 
This to my hypothesis setting to check on it. The hypothesis of variance-
ratio model consists of two parts: 
Ho: (a2 After) / average (a2 Before) = 1 (null hypothesis) 
: average (a2 After) / average (a2Before) <> 1 (alternative hypothesis): 
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function null hypothesis is as a control of model, which means the market 
volatility does not change after the programs announcement. The alternative hypothesis 
is what we concern, which shows the volatility change, 
one, on the markets u"",v,-"<u,,,,u with the announcement of 
greater than or less than 
bailout programs. If the 
result is greater than one, means that the programs enhance the volatility or destabilize. 
On the other hand, the programs stabilize the volatility result is smaller than one. We 
use 95% as our a-level to check significance means that the result is significant p-
value is than 0.05. 
we conclude Ho, 
perform a F-test to check 
HI. 
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the hypothesis. If the F < 
Section B 
Methodology 
For both models, we collect the daily data from Datastream as the range of 250 
days before and 250 days after each program announcement date. Therefore, the sample 
range for each country will be different. In Thailand, the sample period starts on August 
26, 1996, and ends on July 27, 1998 with the program announced on August 11, 1997. In 
Indonesia, the sample period starts on November 15, 1996, and ends on October 16, 1998 
with the announcement on October 31, 1997. In South Korea, the sample period starts on 
December 19, 1996, and ends on November 19, 1998 with the announcement on 
December 4, 1997. This 500 days sample range for each country includes all the 
important events of the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Event-Study Test: 
For my event-study model, I borrow the underlying concept from the Thompson's 
empirical methods of event studies in corporate finance. In the Thompson's method, it is 
concentrate on the corporate stock return. Here, it is concentrating on the countries 
different market indices. The model can help us to identify the relationship between 
dependent variables and independent variables. In addition, some similar models had 
already published by Brown and Warner (1980) (1985), Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll 
(1969), and Kho and Stulz (1999). My model will be similar to the one in Kho and Stulz 
(1999) because of same data source and same approach in findings. In exception, they 
concentrate on the abnormal return on banking sectors, instead of the whole countries 
market indices. 
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For each of the country, in my model, use multiple regression to determine the 
relationship between different variables. For each country, I will have the regression 
models run on three sets of data, which are stock market, foreign exchange, and interest 
rate. For each set of data, I will have three event windows to determine the effect on the 
announcement. The first event window is a I-day on the announcement of the program, 
t = 0. The second event window is in extension of 2 days before and 2 days after the 
announcement, t = -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, total 5-days. The last window is further extends the 
period with 5 days before and 5 days after the announcement, t = -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, I, 2, 
3, 4, 5, total II-days. The data will be 1 for the range of event window, and ° for outside 
the range and as a dummy variable in each set of data. 
In the set of stock market data, the dependent variable for Thailand, Indonesia, 
and South is the daily Bangkok S.E.T. price index, the Jakarta SE Composite price index, 
and the Korea SE Composite (KOSPI) price index respectively. The independent 
variables, which are Asia-DS market price index, World-DS market price index, are 
common for all three sets of data. All of these data will compute into logarithmic daily 
dollar return. The independent variables acts as a benchmark for the dependent variables, 
the return of the country market returns. The dummy variables will plot in. 
In the set of foreign exchange data, the dependent variable is Thai Baht to US$, 
Indonesia Rupiah to US$, and Korea Won to US$. The common independent variable is 
Japanese Yen to US$, and dummy variables. All of these data will compute into 
logarithmic daily dollar return except dummy variables. 
In the set of interest rate data, the dependent variable is Thailand Interbank OIC 
(BT)(SUSP), Indonesia Interbank Call (plPU), and Korea Call Overnight. The common 
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independent variables are Japan Commercial Overnight rate, and US CalI money. 
These will compute in order to the np!1l1l1P"l'l the o and 1. 
Variance-ratio Test: 
model, I compare variance standard the 
before and the announcement day with the same set of that I used the event-
modeL All these data is from the Datastream without further adjustment with 
logarithm. The computation is the after the announcement divided by 
average the announcement. I assume the announcement date 
bailout programs each country to be the mid-point of my comparison. I have ten series 
of range for ron·"" .... " ... and plot in a table. ten series are 5 days, 10 
20 40 and days and after the announcement date. 
variance ratio model will compare the stock market, and 
76 
Section C 
Result 
Event-Study Test: 
Thailand 
In Exhibit 4.1, it shows estimate the abnonnal returns of Thailand's stock 
foreign exchange, interest rate. In the set for stock market, the value 
8, represent abnormal returns that the model investigate. the three windows, all 0 
are o in I-day event window are in .... "'.,.,t,'u"" with the value 
of 0.0033 and 0.0015, indicates with positive sign and to the zero. The 0 
11 event window is having abnonnal return at -0.0011. highest 
abnonnal return in absolute is in I-day event with 0.0033 but insignificant. In the data 
set values 0 in all events are insignificant. The '~r"A-'-' 
abnonnal return n.",~"""""", 1 event window with the value 0.0041. Finally, 
for interest rate data the 0 is the I-day event window with 
abnonnal return at - According to my hypothesis, HI is concluded. 
announcement provides a negative impact on the interest rate return. The 0 in other 
event window are insignificant. 
Indonesia 
In Exhibit 4.2, the 0 the data set for stock market are insignificant for all event 
windows. sign of 0 are in negative, positive, and negative 1 5-days, 11-
days window respectively. In data set of foreign .... ",.'_BY"'.;;;'.." all 0 are . '''~f~llAA,",',,",'' with 
negative sign associate with them. In data sei of interest rate, aU o are still 
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insignificant with the highest abnormal return on the I-day window with the value of 
2.5702. From the above, I cannot make any conclusions because all 8 are in 
insignificant. Hence, the announcements of programs do have impact on the Indonesia 
markets. 
South Korea 
Exhibit 4.3 shows the results of South Korea. For the stock market data set, the 8 
in the I-day window is significant with value at 0.0313 . This concludes to the HI 
hypothesis that the announcement has the positive impact on the stock market on that 
specific day. This states the market respond to the announcement in a short time interval. 
The other two 8 are insignificant with the value in decreasing trend. In the data set of 
foreign exchange, the 8 in the first two windows is insignificant. The 8 in II-days 
window is significant with positive value of 0.0130. This suggests that the 
announcement has a significant impact on the foreign exchange with a longer time for 
market to response. Since the sign is positive, this indicates the currency is in 
depreciation. This implies the announcement cannot stop the Won depreciate relative to 
US Dollar and either enhances the depreciation. In the data set of interest rate, all three 8 
are significant. The value of 8 is 5.6761 for I-day window, 1.6853 for 5-days window, 
and 0.4651 for ll-days window. These show the interest is having positive abnonnal 
returns, which implies the high interest rate associate with the announcement. In 
addition, when the sample time series increase, the value of 8 is in decreasing. This 
shows the degree of impact from the South Korea fade with the time increase. 
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Exhibit 4.1 
Estimate of the abnormal returns of Thailand on the day of the IMF program announcement on August II, 1997 
The foUowing model are estimated for Thailand's stock marekt, foreign exchange market, and interest rate over the 
period from August 26,1996 to July 27, 1998 (500 days) respectively: 
Stock Market 
where: 
Event Windol' 
I - day 
5 - days 
II - days 
Foreign Exchange 
where: 
Event Windol' 
I - day 
5 -day 
11 - day 
Interest Rate 
where: 
Event Windol' 
1 - day 
5 -day 
11 - day 
R II = a I + J3 AI R asla.1 + J3 WI R wol1d,l + 0 I D 1,1 + E 1.1 
R II is the logarithmic daily dollar return on Datastream 
R .. la~ and R world •• are the corresponding market indices of Asia and World 
I is Thailand 
t = (-250, +250) days on before and after the announcement day; 
D is dummy variables take I for event window period, otherwise is 0; 
p-value in bracket 
a J3 AI J3 WI 0 R2 
-0.0011 0.4137 0.3181 0.0033 0.0837 
[ 0.0112] [0.0001 I [ 0.0904] [ 0.7359] 
-0.0011 0.4094 0.3241 0.0015 0.0837 
[ 0.0108] [0.0001 ] 10.0857j [ 0.7362] 
-0.0011 0.4130 0.3123 -0.0011 0.0837 
[ 0.0149] [ 0.0001J [ 0.0976j [ 0.70961 
R - Il. YenlUSS R " D E It - a I + I-' i Yen/USS,I + U I 1,1 + i,l 
R I. is the logarithmic daily exchange rate of 8abt/US$ return on Datastream 
others variables same as above. 
a J3 YenlUSS j 0 R2 
0.0003 0.3708 0.0041 0.0317 
[ 0.2958] [0.0001 ] [ 0.5565] 
0.0003 0.3784 0.0017 0.0316 
[ 0.3138] [ 0.0001] [ 0.5932] 
0.0003 0.3747 0.0002 0.3011 
[ 0.2979] [ 0.0001] [ 0.9131] 
R It = a I + p Japan I R Japan IR,I + J3 us I R us IR,t + 0 I D 1,1 + E 1,1 
R it is the difference in daily interest rate change 
others variables same as above. 
a J3 AI J3 WI 
0.0131 -0.5241 -0.1362 
[0.8475 J [ 0.8008j [ 0.9822] 
0.0041 -0.5881 -0.1106 
r 0.9521] 10.7784] [ 0.9856] 
0.0098 -0.6084 -0.1367 
[ 0.8868] [0.7709 J r 0.98221 
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0 
-3.7579 
10.01381 
0.1435 
[ 0.8346] 
-0.1939 
[ 0.6775] 
R2 
0.0123 
0.0003 
0.0005 
Exhibit 4.2 
Estimate of the abnormal returns of Indonesia on the of the IMF program announcement on October 31,1997 
The following model are estimated for Indonesia's stock marekt, foreign exchange market, and interest rate over the 
period from November 15, 1996 to October 16, 1998 (500 days) respectively: 
Stock Market 
where: 
Foreign I'.XClllm~:e 
where: 
Interest Rate 
where: 
R it a. I + f3 '\ R asla,l + 13 wI R world,l + BID 1,1 + E i,t 
R II is tbe logarithmic daily dollar return on Datastream 
R as",1 and R _rld,t are the corresponding market indices of Asia and World 
I is Thailand 
t = (-250, days on before and after the announcement day; 
D is dummy variables take 1 for event window period, otherwise is 0; 
p-vall.le in bracket 
R II :: a I + f3 YenIUS$l R YenIUS$,l + S j D 1,1 + E 1,1 
R il is the logarithmic daily exchange rate of Rupiah/US$ return on Datastream 
others variables same as above. 
R il is the difference in daily interest rate change 
others variables same as above. 
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Exhibit 4.3 
Estimate of the abnormal returns of South Korea on the day of the IMF program announcement on December 4, 199 
The following model are estimated for South Korea's stock marekt, foreign exchange market, and interest rate over 
the period from December 19, 1996 to November 19, 1998 (500 days) respectively: 
Stock Market 
where: 
Event Windo 
I -
5 days 
11 
where: 
Interest Rate 
where: 
11 -day 
R it :: (J. I + IJ AI Rasia,! + P "'I R wond,! + 0 I 0 1,1 + E i,1 
R II is the 10~'arlth,ml,C daily dollar return on Datastream 
R ""la,1 and R world,! are the corresponding market indices of Asia and World 
J is Thailand 
t "" days on before and after the announcement day; 
D is dummy variables take 1 for event window period, otherwise is 0; 
p-value in bracket 
R - Il Vfln/USS R <: 0 E II - Ct I + ... I VenlUSS,1 ... 0 ! 1,1 + i,1 
R II is the logarithmic daily exchange rate of WonlUSS return on Datastream 
others variables same as above. 
R it :: (J. I ... P Japan I R Japan IR,I ... P us I R uslR,l ... 3 I 0 1,1 ... E 1.1 
R II is the difference in daily interest rate change 
others variables same as above. 
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Variance-ratio test: 
Thailand 
In Exhibit 4.4, it consists of three matrix to show the of ..... ' .. un", after 
and before the program announcement. In matrix tables, I only concentrate on 
parallel comparison on time means my interest will into 
(5vs5), (l Ovs 1 0), (20vs20), (40vs40), and (250vs250) data. 
In the stock market data only the (5vsS) data is insignificant. The other four 
results are (5vsS) result, F IS than one but u' ... ,.t'r' .... ~ ....... 
F in (lOvslO) and (20vs20) are 3.3634 and 6.2983 with p-value 0.0426 and 
0.0001 respectively (significant). The result from (40vs40) and (2S0vs250) are 0.2668 
and which are than one and insignificant. The pass that 
concludes with alternative hypothesis. These results imply that announcement after 
the first 5 days period decrease volatility of the stock market. However, the volatility 
increases after 5 announcement. Then, the 
decreases to less than O.S 40 and 2S0 period with no relationship to the 
announcement. The shows that announcement cannot help to stabilize the 
volatility within 20 trading 
In the data set of foreign excnanlge, the result is insignificant and other 
results are significant. The OvslO), (2Ovs20), and (250vs250) can pass the 
which of them with F-value are crr,:,,:.1"&>,. one. This implies 
announcement cannot stabilize the exchange rate volatility_ In the data set of interest 
results (20vs20) and (250vs250) are only (20vs20) ratio 
the with a greater than one. This »HI>''''.''' the announcement does the 
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volatility within the first 20 days. In general. the announcement does not have the 
significant influence to the interest rate market. And this announcement does not have 
the capabilities to the severe eC()Oclmlc Thailand. 
Indonesia 
Exhibit shows all the results. In the data only the (20vs20) 
one, except the ratio is 'HEr'HJ",""un and All of the 
(5vs5) ratio is less than one but insignificant. implies that the announcement cannot 
stabilize the volatility of the 20 days period. In the foreign exchange market, all results 
ratio can pass and significant, (5vs5) ratio. the announcement, all the 
are mcrease the time increases. This shows announcement cannot 
control the volatility of exchange rate and causes the variance ratio to higher. Finally, 
in the data set of interest the three results are significant and pass the F-test. 
announcement the value of variance interest rate with o-r" .. "t,>r than one. 
cannot stabilize volatility the interest rate. The 
announcement is unable to stabilize the economy. It worsens the situation different 
markets with higher volatility: 
South Korea 
Exhibit 4.6 shows the results of South In the stock market, (20vs20) 
ratio is less one is The ratio other are less one 
but insignificant. seems the announcement in South stabilize volatility in 
the stock market with the ratio than 1. In foreign exchange market, all the results 
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are significant and pass the F-test. In addition, all ratios are greater than one. For the 
(5vs5) ratio is 9.4505, in (10vsl0) the ratio up to 13.3703. After 10 days, the ratios 
decrease against the time series increase. This shows the armouncement affect the market 
in a fluctuation and in decreasing when time series increase. This can conclude the 
impact of the armouncement on the volatility because of the general trend even though 
the two-direction trend. For the interest rate, the (5vs5) ratio is insignificant but with the 
ratio less than one. The ratios of (20vs20), (40vs40), and (250vs250), are greater than 
one and are significant. This implies that the announcement cannot reduce the volatility 
in the interest rate. In general, the South Korea announcement can stabilize its economic 
situation better than the programs in Thailand and Indonesia. 
Exhibit 4.4 
Variance-ratio of Thailand on the day of the IMF program announcment on August II, 1997 
The following model are estimated for Thailand's stock market, foreign exchange market, and interest rate over the 
period from August 26, 1996 to July 27, 1998 (500 days) respectively: 
where: 
Stock Market 
average (cr\ner) I average (cr2BelorJ - F ... J ..... J 
F is the result of the above equation 
Fc is the critical point 
p-value in bracket 
the model is one-tall 
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Foreign Exchange 
5 days 
10 days 
20 days 
40 days 
250 days 
I nterest Rate 
Exhibit 4.5 
Variance-ratio ofIndonesia on the day of the IMF program announcment on October 31,1997 
The foUowing model are estimated for Indonesia's stock market, foreign exchange market, and interest rate over the 
period from November 15 1996 to October 16, 1998 (500 days) respectively: 
where: 
average (O"\nu) I average (O"\",ro"') - F ... 1 ..... 1 
F is the result of the above equation 
Fc is the critical point 
p-value in bracket 
the model is one-tail 
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Stock Market 
10 days 
20 days 
40 days 
250 days 
Foreign Exchange 
10 days 
20 days 
40 days 
250 days 
Interest Rate 
10 days 
20 days 
40 days 
250 days 
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Exhibit 4.6 
Variance-ratio of South Korea on the day of the IMF program announcment on December 4, 1997 
The following model are estimated for South Korea's stock market, foreign exchange market, and interest rate over 
the period from December 19,1996 to November 19,1998 (500 days) respectively: 
where: 
Stock Market 
Foreign Exchange 
average (cr\ne.) I average (cr2 Bofo.J - F .... 1. m-l 
F is the result of the above equation 
Fc is the critical point 
p-value in bracket 
the model is one-tail 
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Interest Rate 
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Section D 
Conclusion 
The limitation for the above models is that we only consider the initial program 
announcement date in order to determine our event window. This ignores other factors 
and events occurred during the sample period for each country. In addition, the model 
did not consider the other non-economic related announcements. The degree of these 
models of the dependent variables against the independent variables limited by its power 
because of the small amount of event windows, which 3 events for each country only. 
This is the reason for the coefficient of determination in event-study model is weak. 
Overall, we examined the impact of the International Monetary Fund programs on 
the abnormal return and volatility on the stock market, foreign exchange, and interest 
rate. I have my statistical conclusion as the following points. 
Firstly, in Thailand, the determination of the abnormal return of the markets 
associated with the announcement. The model cannot explain the abnormal return of 
dependent variables related to the announcement appropriate. I cannot conclude the 
program announcements have positive or negative impact on the economic. The 
abnormal return may associate with the other non-economic factors or political issues. 
The variance-ratio shows that the stock market and foreign exchange rate did not stabilize 
within 40 days, either approximates 2 months. Moreover, the interest rate is increasing 
volatility after the announcement. From the above, I conclude that the Thailand program 
unable to stabilize the economy within 2 months. In the same sense the bailout program 
is expensive but cannot have an instant positive response. 
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Secondly, the situation in Indonesia is similar to Thailand. The abnonnal return is 
not depended on the announcement of the program. In addition, the announcement does 
not have large degree of impact on the economy because of the increasing fluctuation of 
the volatility toward unfavorable level in the three samples. This is hardly to conclude 
that the Indonesia program stabilizes its economic situation. The preservative conclusion 
for Indonesia is that the program did not have any impacts on its economy. In fact, the 
Indonesia program destabilizes the markets volatility. 
Thirdly, the result in South Korea has a better explanation than the result in 
Thailand and Indonesia. I find out that the announcement has a positive abnonnal return 
in I-day window of stock market. After the announcement, the South Korean currency 
keeps depreciation and the interest rate is increasing. This concludes that the 
announcement did not ease the pam of the Crisis in South Korea immediately. In 
addition, the announcement did stabilize the stock market with the ratio less than one. It 
decrease the foreign exchange ratio in tenns stabilize the currency exchange. However, 
the announcement can only stabilize the short-tenn interest rate volatility. In the South 
Korea, the announcement effectively stabilizes the stock market and the short-tenn 
interest rate. On the oth'er hand, it has limited impact on the currency market. 
Therefore, the South Korea program is costly but the degree of benefit cannot outweigh 
the high cost associate with it. In general, the South Korea program has the highest 
capabilities to stabilize the economy situation rather than the Thailand program and 
Indonesia program. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
Through the above four chapters, I have conducted a research on the topic of the, 
"Did the IMF Bailout Programs Stabilize the Markets of Southeast Asia during the Asian 
Financial Crisis?" Each chapter has its objective and related and can lead to my 
conclusion of my thesis. 
Chapter 1, it first covers the background of the International Monetary Fund, 
which had an important role in the Asian Financial Crisis. Second, it discusses about the 
economic situations in Asia region from 1987-96, ten years before the Crisis. It discovers 
that the economic situations were strong and optimistic associate with high economic 
growth rate in the Asia region. This chapter provides a big picture of the International 
Monetary Fund and Asia region with detail information for who is unfamiliar with them. 
Although the economic situations in the Asia region were positive, in fact the Crisis 
happened during 1997-98. This raises several questions. What are the causes of the 
Crisis? What specific events associated with it? What are the roles of International 
Monetary Fund? Chapter 2 handles all of the above questions precisely. 
Chapter 2, it first mentions about the important events during the Crisis period 
that most of them related to the International Monetary Fund. Then, it goes to dissect the 
six major causes of the Crisis. This provides a broad literature on different opinions, 
from economists and financial analysts, on this Crisis. The objective of this chapter is to 
provide detail information on the causes of the Crisis. It also states the relationship 
between the International Monetary Fund and Asian countries. 
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From the above chapters, they enable us to make critical analysis on the Crisis 
through the extensive information in the background of the Crisis. In Chapter it 
concentrates on the ""'11-1"''''' bailout programs applied on Thailand, ll ..... 'VU""l ... , and South 
Korea from the International Monetary Fund. It provides the main provisions in each 
with comparison and contraction. addition, I criticize these bailout programs 
with pros and cons on them. The objective is to understand actions the 
International Fund and to conclude on their efficiency of programs. 
Chapter 3 concludes that bailout programs unable to ease economIC 
situations. Is it true? In Chapter 4, it uses the statistical method to show the actual 
market reactions 
period. 
respond to 
Open Issues - what happen 
After the the 
announcement on programs during the 
the crisis 
the International Monetary was blamed by large 
amount of non-IMF economists and financial analysts on their responses on the Crisis, 
especially on the bailout programs. Since these arguments and blames, the 
instability of the organization structure and goals the International Monetary 
According to the news in the March 7,2000 of Wall Street Journal, it stated 
the majority opinion of the 11 members congressional appointed panel to investigate the 
future of the global financial institutions. Moreover, they come up with two 
to the International Monetary Fund in the 
recommendations are as follow: 
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1. IMF should stop lending to the poorest countries and "'p' .... U.UL.W in emergency 
lending to countries that lose access to private financial markets; 
2. World and IMF should write off all loans to the poorest, if they 
implement effective economic and social policies; 
should be significantly its role in the world than the 
strategy now; 
Stop acting as an international poorhouse that allocates money rich 
countries to the poor countries. 
IMF given too little attention to improving financial structures in developing 
countries and too much too expensive rescue operations in the poorest countries, which is 
concluded by investigation panel. This is exactly appropriate description in 
bailout programs that granted to Asian countries. 
follow: 
Conclusion 
Overall, results are interesting in response to my topic. conclusions are in 
1) 
2) 
The policies in bailout programs consist of 
to ease the severe situation III countries. 
worsen; 
major problems 
additional, these 
problems may cause the 
Thailand nT'r'DT" ...... significant impact on within 2 
months. means that degree capability of program to stabilize 
economy is low. The program cannot <TPY'PY""TP immediate 
the markets with the high cost trade off. 
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on 
3) In Indonesia, the announcement is unrelated to the abnonnal return on the 
market. With the mismatching program provisions. I conclude that the 
program does not stabilize the economy. In fact, the markets are more 
destabilize after the announcement. 
4) In South Korea, the program perfonns better than the Thailand and 
Indonesia. It does have a little positive impact. In addition, the volatility 
in the markets decreases after the announcement of the program. This is 
because South Korea trying to negotiate with foreign investors to roll over 
their loans instead of using large amount of the bailout program to repay 
their loans. 
5) Among these three programs implemented, only the South Korea program 
can stabilize the market. The other two programs that implemented in 
Thailand and Indonesia are unable to stabilize the economy. 
6) The International Monetary Fund policy on the crisis is too costly and the 
reaction is too little. This result same as the current investigation by the 11 
members countries. 
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Appendix 
A· F· . Ie· . Ch sian mancla nSls I rono ogy, 1997 98 
-
1997 
Date Entity Descr~tion 
10-Mar ~hailand !Thai government promises will buy $3.9billion in bad property debt from financial 
·nstitutions but break the promise. 
IMF* Managing Director Michel Camdessus says "he do not see and reason for the Crisis 
o develop further." 
P1-10-May ~apan Japanese officials hinted that they might raise interest rates. 
14-15-May Thailand Its currency, Baht, is hit by a massive attack by speculators. 
~3-May IThailand Moves to save the largest financial company, Finance One, fails 
19-Jun IThailand iAmnuay Viravan, staunchly against devaluing the Baht, resigns as finance Minister. 
IThe PM Chavalit Yongchaiyudh says, "We will never devalue the Baht." 
~7-Jun ~hailand !Thai Central Bank suspends operation of 16 cash-strapped finance companies and 
prders them to submit merger or consolidation plans. 
~O-Jun ~hailand Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh assures that it wi" be no devaluation of the 
Baht 
I2-Jul [The Bank of Thailand announces a managed float of the Baht and calls on the IMF 
~hailand or "technical assistance". The announcement effectively devalues the Baht b} 
labout 15-20 percent at a record low of 28.80 to the US Dollar. This is trigger fOI 
he East Asian Crisis. 
Philippines Philippines Central Bank is forced to intervene heavily to defend the peso. 
8-Jul Malaysia Central Bank, Bank Negara, has to intervene in defense of Ringgit. 
11 -Jul Philippines ~entral Bank says that that will allow the Peso to move in a wider range against the 
US Dollar. 
IMF Backs the move and Managing Director Camdessus says he would recommend the 
IMF board to approve the request of Philippines in an extension of its Extended 
Fund Facility (EFF). 
14-Jul IMF pffer the Philippines almost $1.1 billion in financial support under fast-track 
regulations passed after the 1995 Mexican Crisis. 
Malaysia Central Bank, Bank Negara, abandons the defense of Ringgit. 
17-Jul Singapore ~ingapore Monetary Authority allows the depreciation of the S$. 
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Date Entity Description 
~4-Jul Malaysia The Ringgit hit 38-month low of 2.6530. 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad launches bitter attack on "rogue speculators" 
Hong Kong HK Dollar remains steady, but already spent US$1 billion to intervene during July. 
~6-Jul Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad names hedge fund manager George Soros as 
he man responsible for the attack on the Ringgit. Later called Soros as a "moron". 
28-Jul ~hailand ~alls in the IMF for help. 
5-Aug ~hailand It unveiled austerity plan and complete revamp of finance sector as part of IMF 
Isuggested policies for a rescue package. Central Bank suspends 48 finance firms. 
11-Aug IMF It unveils the rescue package for Thailand including loans totaling in $16 billion. 
14-Aug Indonesia It abolishes its system of managing the exchange rate with a band and allowed to 
~oat. Rupiah plunges to 2,755. Bank Indonesia tries mopping up liquidity with high 
interest rates. 
120-Aug IMF It approves a $3.9 billion credit for Thailand. The package is now total $16.7 billion. 
123-Aug Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad blames US financier George Soros for lead in!:; 
~ttack on East Asian currencies. "All these countries have spent 40 years trying tc 
Ibuild up their economies and a moron like Soros comes along." 
120-Sep Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad tells delegates to the IMFlWorld Bank annual 
Jconference in Hong Kong that currency trading is immoral and should be stopped. 
~1-Sep Hedge Fund iGeorge Soros says, "Dr. Mahathir is a menace to his own country." 
~-Oct Indonesia iAsks the IMF for financial assistance. 
~1-0ct IMF It gives Indonesia $23 billion financial support package. 
B-Nov Asian IStock markets rallied on the day as a financial aid package for Indonesia helped 
estore calm to the region, enable investors there to refocus on . their domestic 
market. 
~-Nov IMF Initial data of Indonesia program 
~-Nov Korea Bank of Korea once again intervened Thursday in an attempt to halt the local 
currency slide versus the US dollar. 
IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus said that the Fund's financial suppor1 
package for Indonesia should break a vicious cycle of economic destabilization ill 
iAsia. He said, "I do not believe that the situation in South Korea is as alarming as 
he one in Indonesia a couple of weeks ago. We are following very attentively and 
rovith an attitude of confidence. 
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Date Entity Description 
14-Nov Korea Majority parties vowed Friday to pass a reform package would clean up debt-ridden 
banks. 
17-Nov Korea Abandoned its defense of the battered won, sending the currency smashing through 
he psychological 1,OOO/US dollar level. 
18-Nov ~orea The failure to pass Financial Reform Bills suggests that the IMF will be required. 
19-Nov IMF Deputy finance ministers meeting in Manila issued a statement that proposed the 
ormation of a new mechanism that would enhance the IMF's role in identifying 
possible financial crises in Asia. 
19-Nov Korea New finance and economy minister said he will form an emergency economic 
presidential advisory committee to tackle the country's current troubles, but does no 
oresee the country requiring assistance from the IMF. 
120-Nov Korea Dashing any early hope for controlling its financial turmoil, South Korea's currenc} 
Ifell 10 percent in trading. 
~1-Nov Korea Under the pressure of currency and investors, it seeks a rescue package from the 
IMF 
j25-Nov ~&P It lowers the South Korea's currency ratings. 
IMF First modification on Thailand program 
1-Dec Korea It and IMF resumed talks on a package to rescue the economy after an initial deal 
~oundered . 
I4-Dec Korea !A record loan package led by the IMF to bailout South Korea helped calm jitters in 
most regional markets. 
5-Dec Korea !Agreed to lower its economic growth to 3 percent in 1998 from a projected 6 percen 
his year under the terms in IMF's rescue package. 
IMF Revises down its forecasts for world economic growth as Asia's economic crumble. 
~-Dec Indonesia President Suharto began an unprecedented 1 a-day rest at home that draw attention 
on Indonesia's uncertain political succession. 
Malaysia Finally confronting its mounting financial woes. 
I9-Dec Indonesia Rumors that President Suharto is gravely ill swept Southeast Asian currenc} 
markets and sending the Rupiah into a tail spin. 
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Date 
15-Dec Korea 
IMF 
i26-Dec Korea 
O-Dec Banks 
Descri tion 
;:"vIUU~~U back from the financial brink as the prospect of billions of dollars in 
credit from the IMF restored confidence in the shattered markets. 
he board meeting in Washington considers a Korean to delivery 
f a of the $60 billion intemational bailout announced Dec. 3. 
with their economy's 
nnn,ntllm." dissident Kim 
ome concerned that the 
voters in South Korea elected 
to serve a five-year term as leaving 
financial markets will be further battered. 
Pledged to speed up $10 billion in bailout money to support its embattled economy. 
It said in a statement that it would make $2 billion available to South Korea on Dec. 
o from the $21 billion already set aside for the financially troubled country. Th 
IMF plans to dole out another $2 billion to Seoul on Jan 8. 
on rebounded strongly on Friday, showing up other Asian currencies that settled 
in well-worn ranges after being numbed by holiday lethargy. 
he world's banks prepared to an effort to throw ailing South Korea 
ifeline rolling over a mountain of short-term debt due to be paid on Wednesday. 
he effort Monday with an announcement from a group of key U.S. and 
German banks is expected to help Korea manage its estimated $100 billion in short 
erm debt, of which $15 billion comes due by Dec. 31 and another $15 billion on 
next month. 
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2-Jan Banks Major U.S. and European banks announced Monday that they would allow South 
Korean customers more time to payoff an estimated $15 billion in short-term deb 
~hich came due on December 31, several smaller banks are unwilling to do the 
Isame. 
~-Jan IThailand !Announced that it would ask the IMF to ease the terms of its $17.2 billion bailou 
package and as its currency, the Baht, fell to a new low of less than half its value 
ast summer. Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai said Thailand would seek to soften an 
IMF requirement that it produce a budget surplus this year. 
~-Jan Indonesia Concern over Indonesia hit Asian stocks on Friday, but currencies won some 
support on hopes of an imminent deal between U.S. banks and heavily indebted 
Indonesian companies . 
Korea A proposal for the govemment to issue about $25 billion in bonds won increased 
support at a meeting of international banks. But several major banks still hesitan 
~bout endorsing the plan, and the Korean govemment indicating it needs another 
~eek to make a decision. 
13-Jan IMF IMF and Indonesia appear to be near an agreement over the IMF bailout. 
15-Jan Indonesia President Suharto announced wide-ranging economic reforms that, if carried out, 
~ould overturn the country's entrenched ways of doing business and curb its 
~conomic growth. 
~7-Jan Indonesia Announced new reforms to restore confidence in its banking sector, guaranteeing 
commercial bank obligations and allowing overseas investment in local banks. I 
also announced a freeze on debt payments until a new framework is worked ou 
between intemational lenders and Indonesian borrowers on estimated at $66 billion 
debt. 
~9-Jan Korea ~overnment and global creditors agreed to exchange about $24 billion of the Asian 
,",ation's short-term debt for govemment-guaranteed loans in a deal expected to 
~nd Korea's liquidity crisis. Under the deal, Korean banks can exchange their 
ishort-term non-trade credits for new loans with maturities of one, two or three years, 
~nd with a floating interest rate of 2.25 percent, 2.5 percent and 2.75 percent over 
he six-month London inter-bank offered rate (UBOR). 
2-Feb iAsia Asian markets roared into the Year of the Tiger with evidence that foreign 
~onfidence in the region was returning. "It's all over, the Asian crisis. That seems 
o be the sentiment this morning," said Callum Henderson, managing analyst a 
MMS Int'\' 
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12-Feb IMF t would relax a key condition of Thailand's economic bailout requiring it to post a 
budget surplus in fiscal 1998. Instead of surplus of 1 percent, Thailand will allow to 
retum a budget deficit of 1 to 2 percent of GDP in the year ending on Sept 30. Also 
IMF allows easing Thai's high domestic interest rates. 
13-Feb IMF Warned Indonesia not to impose a rigid currency regime now because it could 
shake the confidence in the world. Proposed a series of economic reforms before 
establishing a currency board to fix the value of the Rupiah currency. 
16-Feb MF The Rupiah dived through 10,000 in early trade in the wake of weekend reports 
he IMF had threatened to withdraw assistance to Indonesia if it adopts a currenc~ 
board. 
17-Feb Indonesia President Suharto fired Indonesia's central bank governor who opposed governmen 
plans to create a fixed exchange rate systel'" for the Rupiah through a currency 
[board. The IMF, the United Germany and Australia have all come out in 
sition to such a board, developments in Indonesia did not favor it at this 
The IMF has threatened to withhold further money under a $43 billion bailou 
age. 
Korea Separately, the IMF released a further $2 billion to South Korea Tuesday, bringint; 
otal IMF lending to about $15 billion so far out of its $21 billion Seoul rescue 
package agreed last December. 
18-Feb ilMF IMF officials held out hope of a compromise over Indonesia's controversial to 
I 
peg its currency to the dollar. 
20-Feb Indonesia President Suharto made a move to restore fading confidence among 
Indonesians in their government by guaranteeing a pay-out on all deposits in 
16 banks liquidated last year. Government previously had said it would cover up to 
20 million Rupiah in each account of the 16 banks, which amounted to 1.7 trillion 
Rupiah. 
~1-22-Feb Indonesia ~uspended its plan to implement a controversial currency-board system that would 
"ave pegged the Rupiah to the U.S. dollar, due to intense pressure from the U.S. 
land other members of the G-7 industrialized countries, as well as from the IMF. 
24-Feb IMF Second modification on Thailand program 
2-Mar Indonesia Suharto has been at odds with the IMF ovel' stringent economic measures Indonesia 
CI\:II ee .... under a rescue package with the multinational lending institution. Suhartc 
said that the IMF's plan was not working and that Indonesia needed an IMF-Plus 
plan. 
5-Mar Indonesia President Suharto reaffirmed his commitment to IMF reforms. 
100 
Date Entity Description 
9-Mar Indonesia A simmering dispute between the IMF and Indonesia cast a shadow over Pacific 
Rim markets, sending some regional markets down and limiting gains in others. 
Over the weekend news broke that the IMF would delay the disbursement of funds 
o Indonesia. 
~1-Mar IMF The IMF and the Indonesian govemment have made "considerable progress' 
oward a new deal to counter the country's grave economic crisis 
26-Mar Indonesia Indonesia said it is close to a comprehensive package of measures to lift the country 
put of its worst economic crisis in three decades, which include a review of reforms 
Indonesia has agreed to in exchange for a $40 billion bailout. 
S-Apr Indonesia Indonesia said that it had reached agreement with the IMF on a new package 0 
!economic reforms and targets, which the IMF would watch closely to ensure 
!compliance. 
~1-Apr Raised interest rates across the board Tuesday shortly before launching a series 0 
Indonesia eform measures agreed to with the IMF in order to get the country's battered 
economy moving. 
~-May IMF Fourth modification of South Korea program 
13-May Indonesia Indonesian security forces fired shots Wednesday as crowds joined campus 
protests around Trisakti University in Jakarta where the 6 students were killed . The~ 
were the first student deaths in three months of protests against the 32-year rule 0 
Suharto. 
15-May Indonesia Indonesian financial and commodity markets were virtually abandoned, swamped by 
~ear in the aftermath of four days of rioting, arson and looting in Jakarta. 
~1-May Indonesia President Suharto announced his decision to resign from office. The politica 
earthquake which led to Suharto's resignation on Thursday has already had a 
knock-on effect on the economy, with institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank 
and the ADB putting vital bailout funds on hold. 
IMF It has come under fire for making a bad situation worse in Indonesia but analysts 
say Jakarta has little choice but to rely on the fund, no matter who rules the troubled 
nation 
25-May MF Delayed disbursement of the next installment of a $10 billion balance-of-payments 
oan, the central plank of the reform package, pending reassessment of the politica 
~nd economic situation in Indonesia. 
26-May IMF ~hird Modification of Thailand program 
~4-June Indonesia Released Second Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies 
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~4-July IMF Fifth modification of Korea program 
!29-July Indonesia Letter of Intent 
!2S-Aug IMF Fourth Modification of Thailand program 
13-Nov IMF Fifth Modification of Korea program 
1-0ec IMF Fifth Modification of Thailand program 
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